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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
This report assesses the impact of IFPRI’s work on the agriculture negotiations in the WTO’s 
Doha Round. It is set against the context of IFPRI’s mission which emphasizes food security and 
the interests of poor people in low-income countries and underlines the importance of active 
engagement in policy communications to link research work to policy action. The report also 
traces briefly the evolution of IFPRI’s work on international agricultural trade more generally, 
noting its broad disposition to market-oriented policy prescriptions while illuminating the very 
different impacts of agricultural trade liberalization on individual developing countries through 
detailed research at the national and household level.  
IFPRI’s Research in the Context of the Evolving Doha Negotiations 
An outline of key developments in the Doha negotiations is provided as context for a review of 
over 100 IFPRI publications on or related to the WTO negotiations as well as training and 
capacity building activities completed between 1999 to July 2008.  
The report notes the active attention directed by IFPRI from the late 1990s through to the 
breakdown of negotiations in Cancun in September 2003 to the interests of developing countries 
in the Doha negotiations. Important contributions were made by IFPRI to debate about the scope 
of the Round through thoughtful analysis of the “development box” issue and calls for exemption 
for developing countries from some liberalization disciplines in the interests of preserving food 
security. Innovative work in 2002 on the impact of U.S. cotton policies on poor farmers in Benin 
had a major impact. Other useful IFPRI work included modeling the likely impacts on 
developing countries of further trade liberalization. 
IFPRI appeared to step back somewhat from active engagement in Doha-related work from late 
2003 to early 2005. This period encompassed a major reorganization affecting IFPRI’s Division 
responsible for trade research. There was also some disruption caused by senior staff departures. 
Some Doha relevant work was undertaken in this period, including PSE studies of key 
developing countries and detailed South Asia country studies. By comparison, however, with the 
elevated interest and involvement in Doha by the World Bank and high profile development 
advocacy groups, IFPRI played a limited role at a time when the development implications of 
agricultural trade liberalization was at the centre of debate. 
IFPRI’s involvement in agricultural trade research was built up progressively from early 2005 
through to the end of this review in July 2008. Recruitment of new staff and the establishment of 
close links with the French researchers at CEPII brought about a revival in IFPRI’s modeling 
capability. Influential new work using the MAcMaps database (subsequently adopted by the 
GTAP Project) provided much richer and more nuanced treatment of the differential impact of 
various trade liberalization scenarios on different groups of developing countries. Other work on 
developed country agriculture policies, especially the U.S. Farm Bill, attracted attention. IFPRI 
research became more closely attuned to real time debate in the negotiations with a number of 
well timed and targeted contributions through to the collapse of negotiations in July 2008. These 
included work on the duty and quota free access provisions (DFQF) for LDCs, the question of x 
tariff preference erosion, the impact of trade liberalization of African agriculture and further 
global impact assessment work focused on developing countries. Through this period IFPRI staff 
also played a more active role in reaching out to the media and working in collaboration with 
leading think tanks and development advocacy groups.  
Stakeholder Views of IFPRI’s Work on Doha 
Direct sampling of views on IFPRI’s work through interviews and surveying of 114 respondents 
in well placed target groups formed a key part of this impact evaluation.  
Consistent with its mission to link research to policy action, the task outline for the review 
stressed the importance of the perceptions of policymakers and others engaged in policy debate. 
A major effort was made to reach key government advisers and trade negotiators, including 
chairs of WTO negotiating groups or related bodies and WTO Ambassadors coordinating group 
positions (G20, G33, Cairns Group, Africa Group) in the negotiations. Other respondents 
included leading researchers on agricultural trade, senior staff of the WTO (including the 
Director General) and other relevant international organizations, senior staff of influential think 
tanks and development advocacy groups and expert staff in business and legal firms. Detailed 
results are in Section V of the report. 
IFPRI’s work was positively regarded across most groups with particularly high rankings on 
criteria of usefulness and quality from respondents in think tanks, advocacy groups and academic 
researchers. Disappointingly for IFPRI, the views of government officials and those from 
international organizations were somewhat less positive, in many cases reflecting less familiarity 
with IFPRI’s work. Research on Doha from the World Bank was most commonly cited as having 
been influential. Attributes appreciated by those who knew IFPRI’s work included its objectivity 
and clear focus on development impacts.  
Citations and Media Reporting of IFPRI’s Work 
Google Scholar citations and downloads from RePEc (Research Papers in Economics) and the 
IFPRI website were captured for the IFPRI materials under review. Comparative data are shown 
for the IFPRI materials across several years. The results are reported in Section VI of the report 
and were similar to the perceptions of stakeholders in the survey and interviews although strong 
interest in IFPRI’s PSE work and analysis of food regulation is notable. A comparison was 
conducted of citations and downloads of work from IFPRI and parallel work from the World 
Bank and the Carnegie Endowment showing reasonable strong performance for IFPRI.  
Illustrating Pathways to Influence in IFPRI Work 
Section VII of the report takes four “high impact” pieces of IFPRI research and traces the ways 
in which the work influenced policies in national governments, parliaments and in some cases 
the WTO’s processes.  The examples are: 
  Reform of global cotton markets and rural poverty in Benin 
  Duty Free and Quota Free Market Access for LDCs through the Doha negotiations 
  Re-positioning in Pakistan’s trade policy 
  Modeling trade scenarios in Peru  xi 
Conclusions and Lessons for the Future 
This report concludes that despite a dip around 2003–2005, IFPRI has done much to recover and 
build on its earlier standing as a credible and influential research provider in the field of 
international agricultural trade reform. It is now well focused on its core mandate through its 
attention to the impacts of liberalization on developing countries, especially the poorest, and its 
work has been increasingly targeted to relevant issues in the negotiations.  
IFPRI is strongly encouraged to continue its restored emphasis on trade analysis regardless of 
whether the Doha negotiations can be revived following their recent collapse. More than ever 
before, tensions within the WTO membership about further steps in liberalization have 
foundered over differences on the nature and extent of special and differential treatment for 
developing countries. Debate in the public domain and in the negotiations themselves on these 
issues has been highly politicized and only weakly informed by high quality, objective analysis. 
IFPRI’s work demonstrates its comparative strength in precisely this area. It will have a role to 
play even if further reform steps in the next years occur through unilateral national policy moves 
or through bilateral or regional trade agreements rather than the WTO.    
The report does not suggest any diminution in IFPRI’s attention to high quality, peer-reviewed 
analysis or to the depth of knowledge and capability among its research teams at headquarters 
and in the field on circumstances in the agriculture sectors in key developing countries. It does, 
however, argue for a modest enhancement in its engagement with policy makers and advocates, 
including in Geneva. This process has already begun, notably through recent collaborative 
projects with CEPII, the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) 
and work with research staff of the World Bank. Further work is also encouraged with the 
leading think tanks and development advocacy groups active in public debate about agricultural 
trade reform, building on very productive collaboration in recent years with the Hewlett 
Foundation, Bread for the World, and the German Marshall Fund. 
A new trade publication series on agricultural trade is suggested for IFPRI’s consideration, 
perhaps in the form of an annual report which could include analysis of agricultural trade trends 
in developing countries. The landmark OECD monitoring reports of agricultural policies are 
proposed as a possible model although a more modest approach to indicator development would 
be required given resource constraints. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In December 2007, I was contracted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
to conduct an impact evaluation of its work relevant to the WTO’s Doha Round of trade 
negotiations. The evaluation is part of an established IFPRI practice of commissioning external 
evaluations of aspects of its work program. 
In discussions with the Director General of IFPRI, it was agreed that the scope of this evaluation 
should be confined to that part of IFPRI’s research most directly relevant to the WTO’s Doha 
negotiations, notwithstanding the considerable volume of IFPRI research on national and 
regional trade policies and on commodity specific trade issues. ‘On-balance’ judgments have 
been needed to define the precise boundaries of IFPRI’s Doha-relevant work for this project. A 
considerable body of IFPRI research has been conducted on subjects directly relevant to the 
Doha negotiations, in the lead-up to the launch in 2001 and during the negotiating process of 
around seven years since that time. I have erred on the side of also including related research 
which may be tangential to the negotiations per se but which I considered sufficiently relevant to 
Doha negotiating positions adopted by WTO members. This broader research material includes 
analyses of the policies supporting agriculture (producer support estimates or PSEs) in some 
developing countries; research into the impact of various trade policy changes in select 
developing countries, some of IFPRI’s work on SPS and other regulatory barriers to agricultural 
trade; analysis and proposals for reform of some developed-country agricultural policies and 
research into the impact of China’s accession to the WTO.   
The broad remit for this evaluation set out by IFPRI was that it should include: 
1.  comprehending the outputs from the work, including research and capacity building; 
2.  developing a conceptual framework for assessing the impact of the set of activities; 
3.  tracing the influences of the outputs of the program, including the influences on agendas 
of international, regional, and national actors; 
4.  identifying policy responses and other effects generated by these outputs and assessed 
outcomes; 
5.  measuring the ultimate impacts in qualitative and quantitative terms where feasible; 
6.  drawing lessons for IFPRI as a learning organization aimed at improving the potential for 
future impact from programs of this nature and in general; and 
7.  clearly identifying the international public goods that the program has produced. 
The study was also to involve:  
•  contacting and interviewing partners and stakeholders (including policy makers) to elicit 
their perceptions of the influence and value of the program and their associated follow-
ups; and 
•  gathering other data relevant to assessing how the program made a difference, what 
changes were rendered in policy dialogue and decision, including analyses of influences 
via the media. 2 
The Structure of the Report  
This report has been set out as follows: 
This first Section outlines the structure and content of the Report. 
Section II, entitled “Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Development: IFPRI’s Role”, aims to 
provide some contextual background to IFPRI’s mandate and work in the pre-Doha period on 
agricultural trade liberalization and its implications for developing countries.  
Section III, entitled “IFPRI’s Work on Agricultural Trade Liberalization and Links to Doha”, 
consists of a comprehensive documentation and discussion of IFPRI’s “outputs” relevant to the 
Doha negotiations including research materials ranging from books, chapters in books, 
discussion papers, journal articles, research briefs, conference papers, and less formal materials 
prepared for the media or public presentations. An attempt is made to relate these research 
outputs to the Doha negotiations as they have evolved over the period. This Section of the Report 
also describes IFPRI’s program of training and capacity-building activities for select developing 
countries relevant to agricultural trade negotiations. 
Section IV of the Report called “Valuing IFPRI’s Doha Work: Challenges and Approaches”, 
presents a short discussion of difficulties involved in measuring the impact of policy research. 
The problems are especially acute in the field of global analysis involving very large numbers of 
actors in a negotiating process conducted over several years with even further delays in 
implementation before tangible outcomes can be assessed. This Section outlines the approach 
taken to assessing impact in the Report as a whole, includes reference to the full list of research 
materials and capacity-strengthening activities that are considered for the evaluation.  
Section V, entitled “Views of Key Stakeholders on IFPRI’s Work on the Doha Negotiations”, 
draws together the results of a very extensive sampling of views of IFPRI partners and 
stakeholders about the relevance, quality, and influence of the outputs considered as part of this 
evaluation. A central tool for this part of the evaluation was a web-based survey designed to 
elicit quantitative and qualitative assessments from respondents about IFPRI’s work (Survey 
questions are reproduced at Appendix I and the list of respondents, identified by position and 
presented according to target group is at Appendix II)  
The same survey questions were included, along with wider ranging discussion, in personal 
interviews conducted by telephone or in person with a significant number of the respondents. 
Target groups approached for comment included leading academic researchers in the field of 
agricultural trade liberalization and development, senior government policy advisors and 
negotiators directly involved in the Doha round, senior staff of think tanks, research institutions 
and nongovernment organizations, senior staff of the WTO and other international organizations 
involved in agricultural trade and development, and relevant expert staff of business and legal 
firms. Personal interviews took place in Washington DC, Geneva, and Paris. Some 114 targeted 
respondents were approached for comment and results are reported from 81. The results are 
analyzed and interpreted, including by category of respondent.  
Section VI, entitled “IFPRI’s Research in Citations and Media Reporting”, presents and 
comments on the results of an extensive search of citation databases, media monitoring, and 
website downloads of the IFPRI research covered by this evaluation as well as some 3 
comparisons with downloads and citations for similar research from the World Bank and the 
Carnegie Endowment.   
Section VII, entitled “Illustrating Pathways to Influence from IFPRI’s Doha Research” 
elaborates on some of the material from earlier parts of the Report, providing more detailed case 
study narratives of research with high impacts. Section VIII, entitled “Conclusions and Lessons 
for the Future”, offers some comment on the overall “value for money” of IFPRI’s Doha work, 
including its potential international public good value.  
This Section of the Report also makes recommendations, based on the findings of the evaluation 
as a whole, on how IFPRI might enhance further the impact of its work in this and other program 
areas. 
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II. AGRICULTURAL  TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND 
DEVELOPMENT: IFPRI’S ROLE 
Mandate for and Influences on IFPRI’s Trade-Related Research and Activities 
International agricultural trade issues have figured in IFPRI’s work program since the 
organization’s inception in 1975 and were consciously identified among the objectives 
articulated for the newly established Institute by Dale Hathaway, its first Director, as 
“ to determine and publicize those actions which could be undertaken, and those 
policies which could be adopted by governments, regional and international 
agencies, to effect a continued increase in the quantity and quality of food 
supplies available to all people—through enhanced food production, wider trade 
opportunities, and improved efficiency and equity in food distribution” 
(Hathaway 2005) 
Trade-related research has continued throughout IFPRI’s history, although the resources devoted 
to this work have waxed and waned over the years both with the rhythm of international trade 
negotiating activity and with the varying emphasis placed on agricultural market and trade 
reforms in national development programs. At times, also, research on trade liberalization has 
been seen as controversial. In a history of IFPRI’s first decade the author, Curt Farrar, notes 
some tension between players within IFPRI and others in the wider CGIAR network about the 
relevance of IFPRI work on international trade, especially where it led to conclusions which 
were critical of the agricultural support and protection policies of donor countries (Farrar 2000). 
The balance in IFPRI’s research agenda between global and economy-wide analyses of 
agricultural trade issues and more micro-level country and commodity analyses has varied over 
time, as has the extent to which IFPRI has developed and maintained in-house modeling 
capability as a tool for this area of its research. 
The record shows, nevertheless, that over the years, IFPRI’s management has pursued a 
substantial volume of trade-related research, seeing it as directly relevant to IFPRI’s vision as 
currently articulated of “a world free of hunger and malnutrition” and its mission in pursuit of 
this vision focuses on  
•  identifying and analyzing alternative international, national, and local policies in 
support of improved food security and nutrition, emphasizing low-income countries 
and poor people and the sound management of the natural resource base that supports 
agriculture;  
•  Contributing to capacity strengthening of people and institutions in developing 
countries that conduct research on food, agriculture and nutrition policies; and 
•  Actively engaging in policy communications, making research results available to 
those in a position to apply or use them, and carrying out dialogues with those users 
to link research and policy action” 
(IFPRI’s Strategy: Toward food and nutrition security, 2007) 6 
The same document outlines the themes for IFPRI’s work to which it accords weights and 
directions for level of effort. In this categorization, IFPRI’s trade work falls into both Focus  
Area A on the efficient and fair functioning of global and national food and agriculture systems. 
Within this Focus Area, work on globalization, trade and markets is accorded only a low budget 
weighting and as at 2007, this allocation was expected to be maintained. Some trade-related 
activity is also carried out under Focus Area B on effective strategies and governance at the 
global, regional, and national levels through the governance and policy processes research theme 
which is also accorded a low budget weighting but an increase in effort level was anticipated. 
Much of IFPRI’s trade related activity occurs in the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division 
(MTID) but some trade-related country or issue-specific work is conducted in other parts of the 
organization, particularly the Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD). The 
current structure reflects changes to IFPRI’s structure which were made in 2003 with the major 
trade functions moving from the Trade and Macroeconomics Division to the new MTID and 
broader economic analysis functions moving to the new DSGD. (Current and pre-2004 IFPRI 
organization charts are included at Appendix III) 
With IFPRI’s commitment to analytical rigor and an established emphasis on peer-review 
scrutiny, it should be no surprise that broadly speaking its trade-related research has fallen 
comfortably within the mainstream perspectives of the agricultural economics profession. 
Having said that, and as will emerge from the discussion below on pre-Doha research influences 
and in the following Section which deals in detail with IFPRI’s Doha related activities, the 
orientation in IFPRI’s trade research strongly reflects the organization’s focus on food security 
and poverty reduction.   
In framing and conducting its trade work, IFPRI has had an advantage in being able to tap a 
depth of research capability encompassing knowledge of the agricultural sectors of a large 
number of developing countries, including some of the smallest and poorest. Its network of field 
offices Addis Ababa, Abuja, Beijing, Dakar, Kampala, New Delhi, and San Jose, its links with 
developing-country governments and research institutions and expert staff and collaborators 
from developing countries have all helped to bring a richness and nuance to IFPRI’s analysis of 
global trade liberalization. Its headquarters location in Washington DC provides highly 
productive links with the global international financial institutions as well as access to perhaps 
the world’s most vibrant policy advocacy community and media hub. IFPRI’s internationally 
diverse Board and its close association with the other elements of the CGIAR network all 
constitute assets for information gathering and influence.  
From its earliest work through to its most recent, IFPRI has been attentive to the differences in 
agricultural production and trade profiles of different developing countries. Some of its most 
influential work has combined broad analysis of global impacts of trade liberalization with 
detailed assessments of impacts in particular developing countries or regions. While there is a 
general pre-disposition in most of IFPRI’s research favoring openness and market-orientation 
over interventions and distortions in policy prescription, its analysts have not shied away from 
reporting negative consequences for particular countries or (especially vulnerable, low income) 
groups within countries, even where broader net positive benefits are identified. As a 
consequence, IFPRI research on trade reform has frequently been directed to its likely impacts 
on poverty and income distribution. It has also emphasized the importance of “complementary 
policies” to accompany trade reforms including in areas such as domestic market reforms in 7 
agriculture and the wider economy, provision of infrastructure to support efficient agriculture 
initiatives, health, education and targeted social interventions.  
By comparison, the World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group Review (2006) concluded the 
Bank’s trade policy advice in the period up to about 2004 had not sufficiently emphasized these 
factors and had tended to adopt a “one size fits all” approach. These issues have been given 
heightened attention more recently and indeed The Bank has made a significant contribution in 
this area, as reflected for example in the rich harvest of materials published in 2006. Particularly 
relevant in this context was a substantial volume of papers on poverty and the Doha agenda 
edited by Hertel and Winters but two other Doha-related World Bank volumes, one of which 
includes contributions from IFPRI research, also helped set this criticism to rest (Anderson and 
Martin 2006; Newfarmer 2006). A clear exposition of the World Bank’s latest thinking on the 
heterogeneity of developing-country experiences under trade liberalization is provided in the 
latest World Development Report which states bluntly that “there will be losers across and 
within developing countries” and devotes considerable attention to spelling out the reasons and 
broad likely outcomes. Again, IFPRI research is included in the references cited for the trade 
chapter of this publication (World Development Report 2008). 
Key Influences and IFPRI Outputs in the Pre-Doha Period 
To provide some context for the main focus of this Report on the Doha negotiations, the 
following attempts to provide a brief review of the evolution of IFPRI’s work on multilateral 
trade reform through to 1999 when work on resumed multilateral trade negotiations on 
agriculture got under way through the WTO. 
The Case for Liberalization to Tackle the Bias against Agriculture 
IFPRI’s trade-related work during the late 1970s and 1980s was done against the backdrop of 
concerns on the part of development economists generally about the inefficiencies of import 
substitution strategies and the bias against agriculture implicit in the policies, including exchange 
rate policies, of many developing countries. Influential studies by Little, Scitovsky, and Scott 
(1970) and Balassa (1971) stimulated a major focus on liberalization in adjustment lending 
programs at the World Bank to enhance economic efficiency by fostering openness in economic 
policy. Work by Krueger, Baghwati, and others reinforced these findings which were further 
elaborated after Krueger’s appointment in 1986 as Chief Economist at the World Bank. This 
approach was paralleled by work on developing country policies at IFPRI championed by 
Alberto Valdes which drew on experience in Latin America and Africa and subsequently other 
countries including the Philippines and Pakistan. The research by Valdes and others at IFPRI 
ultimately led to the publication of a book called “The Bias Against Agriculture: Trade and 
macroeconomic policies in developing countries” which made the case for better functioning 
agricultural markets and reduced trade distortions to foster growth and reduce poverty (Bautista 
and Valdes 1993). Valdes also played a leading part in collaborative work in this area between 
IFPRI and the World Bank as reflected in the very substantial five volume comparative study 
series called “The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy” which had a powerful 
impact on thinking in the profession and in the policies of the international financial institutions 
as well as member governments (Krueger, Schiff, and Valdes 1992).    8 
IFPRI trade research during this period also tackled the implications of developed-country 
agricultural policies on the welfare and food security of developing countries. A landmark IFPRI 
Research Report by Valdes and Zeitz in 1980 used a model constructed at IFPRI to show the 
implications for a range of developed and developing countries of reductions in OECD country 
protection of agriculture. Further work on this subject using more recent data was commissioned 
from IFPRI by the World Bank in 1985 and the Bank’s World Development Report of 1986 
drew extensively on IFPRI research in its arguments for agricultural trade liberalization in the 
interests of both developed and developing countries.  
IFPRI produced a body of work directly relevant to the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations 
around the time of their launch in 1986 and during the long period of the negotiations. IFPRI’s 
conclusions continued to favor greater openness for developing-country agriculture, but its 
research also argued for “special and differential” provisions to take account of the 
circumstances of low-income and chronic food-deficit countries and those affected by preference 
erosion. A more substantial research effort and direct engagement in the debate about reform of 
the global agricultural trade framework at that time was probably attributable to the OECD 
which in 1987 achieved a commitment to market-oriented reform from Ministers of its member 
governments and launched its Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) methodology for measuring 
trends in support along with its annual policy monitoring reports which have continued since the 
(OECD 2007). Nevertheless, IFPRI certainly made a contribution. Increasingly also, IFPRI 
work, for example, an occasional paper on regional trade prospects in southern Africa by Valdes 
and Muir-Leresche (1993) focused on the broader national market reforms and accompanying 
policies that were needed for developing countries to take advantage of greater market access 
opportunities. 
After some efforts by the key research institutions to assess the impacts of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) following its conclusion in 1994 (notably Martin and 
Winters 1996) attention to global agricultural trade liberalization at IFPRI and other key 
institutions dropped away somewhat until toward the end of the decade. There are logical 
explanations for this, including the hiatus in multilateral trade negotiations necessary to allow the 
full implementation of the Uruguay Round outcome to be played out. Another significant factor 
following the conclusion of NAFTA in 1993 was a heightened interest in both developed and 
developing countries in regional and bilateral trade agreements. At the World Bank, for example, 
the World Bank IEG Report (2006) notes a decline in emphasis on analytical work and lending 
on trade from the mid 1990s until a reappraisal and intensification of focus occurred in about 
2001. 
Debate about further steps in agricultural trade liberalization got under way by the late 1990s in 
the WTO as called for under the “continuation clause”, or Article 20, of the Uruguay Round 
Agreement on Agriculture. As preparations got under way for the ill-fated Seattle Ministerial 
Conference of the WTO in 1999 discussion intensified about an appropriate focus for what was 
then being called the “Millennium Round” of trade negotiations. (A time line of key events 
relevant to the Doha negotiations is provided at Appendix IV.) 
New Challenges to Liberalization in Agriculture  
The broad consensus among economists continued to support openness and reduction of trade-
related distortions as important elements of pro-growth strategies for developing as well as 9 
developed countries. Much had been achieved in the reform of trade policy settings in 
developing countries but some reform fatigue had emerged in the wake of the financial crises 
which unfolded from 1998 in a number of the more open Asian and Latin American economies. 
At the same time, a broad range of nongovernment organizations active in development, labor 
and environmental debates adopted a distinctly negative view of the impact of further trade 
liberalization.  
The reasons for this spike in anti-globalization sentiment were many and varied. Part of the 
explanation lay in a natural sympathy for those likely to be displaced at least in the short term, by 
the process of “creative destruction” involved in adjustment to new competitive conditions, 
particularly in developing countries where poverty and food security were part of the picture. 
There was also some justified support for the view that the achievements of the Uruguay Round 
had been oversold. Developed countries were seen to have been let off the hook lightly when it 
became clearer that only relatively modest new market access opportunities had emerged for 
developing countries and continuing high levels of support for agriculture had been permitted for 
developed-country farm sectors despite some reductions in the degree of distortion in the nature 
of that support. Moreover, developing countries had come to appreciate the complex challenge 
and transition costs involved in managing deeper integration into the global economy and 
struggled with limited capacity to take advantage of the opportunities presented through their 
WTO membership. 
Another strand in the anti-trade debate was environmental, with WTO dispute action
1 triggering 
concern about what some saw as the excessive reach of the WTO’s rules to regulation by 
domestic authorities.   
On the labor front, adjustment and dislocation in traditional industries of developed countries in 
the face of the burgeoning competitiveness of emerging economies in Asia and elsewhere, led to 
allegations of unfair competition, or “social dumping” in European parlance, and was associated 
with NAFTA and other regional and bilateral trade agreements as well as multilateral trade 
liberalization.  
Finally, following the adoption of work in the WTO on investment, competition, government 
procurement and trade facilitation at the Singapore Conference in 1996, those who were cautious 
about an expanding remit for liberalization at the global level had a broader set of issues for 
concern. As well as uncertainty about the possible implications for global disciplines in these 
new areas on national governments, the rapid expansion of WTO membership after 1995 
generated a sense of “overload” for many smaller developing-country members with limited 
expert capability. Tensions around intellectual property disciplines, including their link to 
concerns about access to medicines in developing countries, also played a part. 
                                                      
1 The EU/US beef hormone ruling of 1997 and the United States/India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Thailand shrimp/turtle 
ruling in 1998. 10 
The attention of international institutions and researchers turned more consciously to these issues 
as debate swirled around about a suitable agenda for a new round of global trade negotiations.  
Debate and drama was destined to persist, however, throughout the course of the Doha 
negotiations and the following Section of this Report documents and discusses IFPRI’s work 
against the background of debates and disputes over the scenarios advanced by different parties 
for the Doha round.  
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III.  IFPRI’S WORK ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION 
AND LINKS TO DOHA 
This Section focuses on the key subject of the Report, that is, the evolution of the Doha 
negotiations and IFPRI’s Doha-related research outputs from 1999 through to the collapse in 
negotiations of July 2008, and relates this work to the issues under debate in the trade 
negotiations. As noted in the Introduction, the Report includes some work which is relevant but 
not directly Doha-related. A complete list of IFPRI research materials reviewed for the Report in 
each of the years from 1999–2008 is provided in Appendix V. The research materials could be 
seen as falling into three broad categories. The first group covers global impact assessments, 
often using CGE modeling, of the likely impacts of various Doha scenarios. The second group of 
materials assesses more specific issues in the negotiations of particular interest to developing 
countries such as food security, special and differential treatment provisions and broader issues 
like food safety and SPS barriers. The third category includes a disparate range of research on 
the effects of agricultural liberalization in particular countries or affecting particular 
commodities. Much of this latter category is focused on developing countries or regions 
(including India, Mexico, the Philippines, the Near East and North Africa, China, and others) but 
some deals with the implications of changes in developed country agricultural support and 
protection, for example, a significant stream of work on the U.S. Farm Bill. 
A more systematic effort to assess the impact of IFPRI’s Doha work is made in the next Section 
of the Report, which also includes the results of survey and interview responses from key 
stakeholders. In this Section, however, the focus is on the highlights of what was produced and 
the relevance of IFPRI’s trade work to the Doha agenda. 
Discussion of the issues in this Section has been organized around what I have identified as 
distinct milestones in the negotiations. A more detailed time line of key events in the Doha 
process is provided at Appendix IV, but the discussion here is divided into five phases with the 
staging points being: 
•  issues elaboration and launch of the Doha Round, 
•  early negotiations then the breakdown in Cancun, 
•  achievement of the ‘July Framework Agreement’ in August 2004, 
•  suspension of Doha negotiations in July 2006, and 
•  resumption of work on a modalities text and efforts to complete the Doha negotiations. 
Launching a New Multilateral Trade Round—1999 to 2002 
Negotiations on further steps in agricultural trade liberalization were mandated to resume by late 
1999 or early 2000 under the terms of Article 20 (the “continuation clause”) of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) but most had anticipated better prospects for success 
if agriculture could be included as part of a more comprehensive negotiating round. A great deal 
of focus was therefore given to articulating the scope and focus of possible new negotiations, 
which were generally referred to as a “Millennium Round” but from the outset, agriculture was 
seen as the central element. 12 
The previous section of this Report noted the emergence of and some of the reasons for critical 
attitudes towards further trade liberalization in the lead-up to the December 1999 Seattle 
Conference. Following the surprise collapse of that meeting the attention of international 
institutions and researchers returned more consciously to these issues. IFPRI, like others, played 
its part. In the WTO itself, proposals were submitted by members (126 members contributed to 
some 45 proposals) and “Special Sessions” then, later, more formal meetings of the Agriculture 
Committee were held in the search for a consensus about the scope and objectives of new 
negotiations. Proposals from some members and groups were comprehensive, covering inter alia 
the three pillars of the URAA (market access, domestic support and export competition) and 
others dealt with more specific issues such as food safety and quality, nontrade concerns, state 
trading enterprises, and animal welfare. Proposals from developing countries often concentrated 
on food security and aspects of special and differential treatment provisions that were sought to 
moderate developing-country liberalization commitments. (A list of the proposals received in 
2000 and 2001 is included in a background document on the WTO website.) Positions put 
forward by different groups of members were widely at variance.  
With hindsight, perhaps the struggles which later ensued in the negotiations might have been 
better anticipated. As preparations for the Doha Conference took place the United States was 
heavily engaged in its “competitive liberalization” process of bilateral and regional Free Trade 
Agreements and early preparations for the 2002 Farm Bill did not suggest a more liberal 
outcome was likely to emerge. The EU was pre-occupied with its enlargement agenda and a 
complex and difficult internal process of agriculture policy reform. It was clear from the outset 
that Europe’s  Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform would focus more on re-
instrumentation of domestic support to reduce its distortive effects than on border measure 
reforms that might have accorded significant new global market access opportunities. A 
distraction from the liberalization agenda also was the EU’s focus on ‘non-trade concerns’ aimed 
at seeking a higher level of intellectual property protection for its traditional agricultural products 
and processes.  
While the perspectives of the two major WTO members, the US and the EU, had in previous 
trade rounds had very significant sway over the ultimate outcomes, in the post-Uruguay Round 
period the number of developing country members in the negotiating process had grown 
dramatically and as was to become evident, would have an unprecedented impact on the way 
negotiations unfolded. In the case of the new developing country members, however, many had 
limited capacity to devote to the negotiations in Geneva and capitals and as noted above, an 
increasingly “defensive” position from them on new commitments was emerging. 
The Doha negotiations were launched, nevertheless, at the November 2001 Ministerial 
Conference in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and at a time of graver 
concern than usual in the international community about the future of an interconnected world. 
The negotiating mandate was surprisingly ambitious in tone, coverage, and timeframes for 
negotiation. It also paid heightened attention to development issues, through explicit agreement 
to special and differential provisions but also through repeated textual references to issues of 
development concern like food security and rural development. Indeed from this point the 
negotiations also came to be known as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). As was later to 
become clear, the Doha mandate papered over sharp differences in both scope and ambition 
within the membership, including among developing countries. Ernesto Zedillo provides 13 
insightful commentary on the tensions between the language of the Doha mandate and the 
prospects of delivering it. This has been evident in the extended stop-start rhythm of the 
negotiations (Zedillo 2007).  
IFPRI’s Outputs—1999 to 2002 
The picture that emerges from IFPRI’s work in this period is that of an organization attuned to 
tensions in the negotiating environment and focused consciously on the development 
implications of competing approaches to a trade round.
2 In addition to the research outputs on 
global trade negotiations, it is clear from internal IFPRI Internal Program Review documents that 
the organization was active in outreach to governments and nongovernment development groups 
in this period with frequent staff involvement in briefings, conferences, and seminars with a 
broad range of interested parties.  
Some useful descriptive pieces were published on the issues at stake and the significance of the 
negotiations for development, picking up on discussions about the inclusion of a “development 
box” in the new agreement. The strands of this work were drawn together in the IFPRI 
discussion paper by Diaz-Bonilla, Robinson, Thomas, and Yanoma (2002). An important 
conclusion in this work was the great heterogeneity of circumstances among the developing-
country membership of the WTO and the need for objective means of distinguishing their 
situations. A major contribution was made to the emerging debate in the WTO membership 
about the provisions that might be included in the Doha text to take account of the development 
needs of members, and particularly those related to food security in this and related work (Diaz-
Bonilla et al. 2002; Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2000; Diaz-Bonilla and Thomas 2001; and Diaz-Bonilla, 
Robinson, and Thomas 2002). Using some innovative cluster analysis, IFPRI took a clear-headed 
look at food-insecurity issues which were being debated in the WTO and made a compelling 
case for careful distinction between countries which are food insecure and those that are net food 
importers but might not be food insecure; the research also offered useful advice about the most 
appropriate ways to tackle this serious question in the negotiations, concluding that broad-based 
exemptions from commitments might not be the most productive approach. While embracing the 
merits of developing countries being given some scope to deal with exceptional import surges, 
IFPRI cautioned against the damaging impacts of protection on food in developing countries.  
Under the guidance of the then Director of the Trade and Macroeconomics Division, Sherman 
Robinson, resources were committed to the construction of a CGE model that would enable 
IFPRI to produce impact assessments of competing trade liberalization scenarios. An example of 
the modeling work from this period, using GTAP 5 data, was published in the American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics (Diao, Roe, and Somwaru 2002) and focused on the distorting impact 
of OECD policies on global agricultural markets. In an early expression of the thrust of IFPRI’s 
impact assessments of later years, this research drew attention to the mixed impact of reforms on 
food security of developing countries but noted positive welfare gains for developing countries 
in the long run. 
                                                      
2 Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, who made a major contribution to IFPRI’s trade work in this period, actually attended the 
Seattle Conference. 14 
Negotiations Gather Pace Ahead of the Setback in Cancun—2002 to 2003 
A cracking pace of three years to completion was set for the Doha negotiations and informal 
discussion on technical and specific proposals took place in Geneva in an effort to achieve a 
modalities text by March 2003 for consideration at the Cancun Ministerial Conference in 
September 2003. There was little sign, though, of coalescence around a consensus approach and 
the Chair of the Agriculture negotiations, Stuart Harbinson, made repeated calls for members to 
come together on the key issues. His lengthy overview document, circulated to WTO members in 
December 2002 (WTO document TN/AG/6), lists positions of members on all the issues and in 
the absence of movement from the parties, the Chair issued his own text in February (First Draft 
of Modalities for the Further Commitments”, WTO document TN/AG/W/1) and produced a 
revised version of it in March 2003. Harbinson’s efforts were rebuffed, particularly by some 
developed-country members who did not accept the ambition implicit in his proposed market 
access modalities which incorporated a “banded” tariff formula aimed at tackling tariff peaks and 
escalation. In response to the intense food security and “development box” debate in preceding 
months, Harbinson had also introduced “special product” provisions for developing countries 
where food security, rural development and livelihood security were at stake. Members’ 
positions remained polarized, however, as the March 2003 deadline was missed and even after 
further technical discussions in Geneva through to the middle of the year. Doha appeared at risk 
of stalemate as the Cancun date approached. 
At one of many informal “mini-Ministerial” meetings, this time in Montreal in July 2003, key 
members seemed ready to consider compromise and in response to suggestions from participants 
at Montreal, the US and EU agreed to work bilaterally on a breakthrough proposal. Their 
perspectives, especially on market access, were far apart at that point and it was hoped that if 
these two major members could reach an agreement, it might be suitable for wider adoption. 
The US and EU released a draft “framework” paper in August 2003 covering some of the key 
issues and proposing a new “blended formula” for tariff cuts. Somewhat surprisingly, given the 
development focus of the previous months’ discussions, the US/EU text was silent on special and 
differential treatment issues. As with the Harbinson text, criticism of the details came from many 
quarters but a particularly sharp reaction emerged from the newly formed G20 developing 
country-only group which included Brazil, India, and China as key members. The broad thrust of 
their rejection lay in the view that in both market access and domestic support, the two majors 
were proposing insufficient liberalization from developed countries to meet the terms of the 
Doha mandate. The text’s attempt to differentiate between developing countries by denying 
special and differential treatment to competitive net food exporters added fuel to the fire. (The 
G20 response was re-circulated as a WTO ministerial conference document, WT/MIN [03] W/6). 
In the limited time remaining before Cancun, the chair of the General Council, Carlos Perez del 
Castillo, chose to incorporate much of the content of the US/EU text into the draft Cancun 
ministerial declaration. This, in turn, was largely incorporated into the revised draft presented to 
the Conference by Mexican Foreign Minister, Louis Derbez.  
The Cancun Conference had been intended as an important step on the path to completion of the 
Doha Round but in the event some of the atmospherics of the earlier Seattle Conference re-
emerged, including the presence in the surrounding area of many protesters. Within the 
Conference itself, the mood was tense with many developing countries, encouraged by a large 15 
NGO presence, objecting to parts of the draft declaration. In meetings between delegations and 
groups outside the formal sessions it was evident that large gaps existed over the agriculture text 
but even stronger objections were registered to the incorporation of the four “Singapore issues”. 
Another prominent focal point for discontent came from a newly coordinated group of African 
developing countries (“the Cotton Four”—Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali) who, with 
strong support from development groups, were calling for accelerated action to remove 
distortions caused by developed-country policies on world cotton markets. 
The agriculture text was never formally negotiated at Cancun and while there was some 
preliminary debate about removing some of the Singapore issue language from the draft 
declaration, in the end the meeting ended without result. 
IFPRI’s Outputs—2002 to 2003 
During the period between the Seattle and Cancun conferences IFPRI’s focus turned more 
deliberately to the Doha round and its development implications. More than had generally been 
the case in the past, IFPRI research was published in the form of briefings and newsletters, both 
in IFPRI’s own series of materials (Diaz-Bonilla, Orden, and Thomas 2003; Watkins and von 
Braun 2003; Diao, Diaz-Bonilla, and Robinson 2003) and in conjunction with other actors in the 
debate such as the increasingly influential Bridges newsletter and the World Economic Forum 
(von Braun, Grote, and Wobst 2002; Diaz-Bonilla 2002). 
Proceedings from conference and discussion sessions also figured prominently at this time (Diaz-
Bonilla 2003; Orden and Taylor 2003) suggesting the organization placed a high priority on 
being heard on the issues under direct consideration in the negotiating process. The thrust of 
IFPRI’s arguments in this work was to underline the damaging impact of OECD agricultural 
distortions on agriculture in many developing countries, calling for further big steps with this 
“unfinished business” and acknowledging the need for special attention to impacts on the 
situation of poor producers. IFPRI’s work, however, continued to make the case for developing 
countries themselves to avoid policies which would continue the “bias against agriculture” in 
their economies, with Diaz-Bonilla suggesting developing countries resist the temptation to 
adopt defensive positions in the negotiations, except through targeted and limited measures, 
noting that more broad based exemptions for developing countries to allow for higher and 
permanent protection for food products “most likely worsens the plight of the poor, who are 
basically net buyers of food” (p.113). 
IFPRI also continued to produce its more usual analytical reports during this period, many of 
which had a strong focus on the development and poverty implications of agricultural trade 
liberalization, such as the well-timed piece by Minot and Daniels. Further reference will be made 
to this and associated IFPRI work, but it should be noted here that IFPRI’s initiative to analyze 
with such care the negative impact of the U.S. cotton program on world cotton prices, and in turn 
on marginalized farmers in a small central African country, provided a good example of high 
quality, high impact research which proved to be extremely well timed given the focus on cotton 
in Cancun and afterwards (Minot and Daniels 2002).   
Turning attention in a different way to the damaging impact of developed-country policies on the 
interests of agricultural producers in developing countries, and targeting debate about the U.S. 
Farm Bill which many saw as sending a negative signal about the seriousness of Washington’s 16 
ambitious positioning in Doha, David Orden produced a valuable piece in 2002 and would return 
to this theme in various ways in the following years (Orden 2002). 
Other analytical contributions were produced tackling issues of broad interest such as the 
interplay between multilateral and regional trade liberalization (Diaz-Bonilla et al. 2003). A 
major stream of work was also conducted in conjunction with the Danish Research Institute of 
Food Economics which was later published by that organization. 
Overall in this period IFPRI’s work outputs reflect a significant effort was being made to 
contribute effectively to the vigorous debate taking place among governments, development 
groups and other commentators about an appropriate course for the Doha negotiations.  
Achieving the July Framework Agreement—Late 2003 to August 2004 
For six months after the Cancun setback there were no formal negotiating sessions at the WTO 
and talks were described as “temporarily discontinued” rather than suspended. Much quiet 
activity took place in the margins between the most active parties, including through meetings 
and position development on the part of the newly formed developing-country groups, the G20 
(in which Brazil and India took the most prominent roles) and the more defensive G33 (in which 
Indonesia and the Philippines were prominent and which focused especially on the special 
products issue). The two majors, after a short period of reflection, re-entered the fray with a call 
for resumption by USTR, Bob Zoellick, in January 2004 with the agenda pared back to 
agriculture, services and industrial goods. Key ministers and the WTO Director General invested 
much time and travel in rescue efforts, meeting in locations as far flung as Dakar, Sao Paolo, and 
Paris in the following months. The EU made a significant contribution in May 2004 to keeping 
the process alive with a conditional offer to set a date for the elimination of export subsidies, 
seen by many agricultural exporting countries an essential, if not sufficient, condition for an 
agreement. 
A considerable amount of dialogue took place quietly in Geneva and other capitals, at both 
senior official and Ministerial level in this period, in a group which came to be known as the 
“Five Interested Parties” or “FIPS”, consisting of the US, the EU, Brazil, India, and Australia. 
This grouping reflected the reality now evident in the Doha process that an outcome could not be 
reached without consensus in agriculture and that developing countries would play a more 
decisive part. Brazil’s heavy investment in its work in the G20, along with India and others, 
while giving only modest emphasis to its Cairns Group membership, marked a key change in 
dynamic for the negotiation overall. Equally, India’s inclusion in a key brokering group of this 
kind demonstrated its more active engagement in the negotiations and arguably some shift from 
its previously extremely cautious approach to agricultural liberalization. The G10, including the 
developed countries with the highest levels of support and protection and the most conservative 
positions on reform such as Norway, Switzerland, Japan, and Israel, also continued to make their 
voices heard. At the same time, multiple and overlapped groups of members were active such as 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific group (ACP) which was especially focused on the issue of 
preference erosion, the African group, concerned about a range of development issues including 
food security and vulnerable economy concerns, the Least-Developed Countries (LDCs) which 
concentrated on special and differential treatment issues and technical assistance a recently-
acceded members group calling for lesser obligations to facilitate their adjustment to 
membership and the Cairns Group with its focus on ambitious results, particularly market access. 17 
(See the background document on the WTO website for a description and membership of the 
various negotiating groups.) The FIPS acted informally but continued to meet regularly through 
to the July 2004 meeting of key Ministers in Geneva. On occasion it also met in a smaller G4 
format of the EU, US, Brazil, and India.   
Meetings of the wider WTO membership resumed in March 2004 and in an interactive process 
led by the new chair of the agriculture negotiations, Tim Groser, key issues were crunched in 
numerous groupings and formats with the chair active in urging members to find a way forward 
but resisting the temptation to get too far in the lead. On more than one occasion, it appeared that 
the process might have to be abandoned but movement occurred in steps. Compromise outcomes 
eventually coalesced including around a package (outlined in brief later in this Section). After an 
all night session of some 30 delegations on 31 July 2004 a framework text covering agriculture 
and a pared back group of other issues was agreed and following consideration by the wider 
membership was circulated on 2 August 2004 (see WTO document WT/L/579). 
IFPRI’s Outputs—September 2003 to August 2004 
A review of IFPRI’s research outputs in this period seems to suggest some stepping back from 
the more energetic engagement it appeared to have made in the Doha negotiations in the 
previous period. Work continued on agricultural liberalization, and some material continued to 
be focused directly on the Doha negotiations such as von Braun, Gulati, and Orden’s 
presentation to a WTO Public Symposium in Geneva in May 2004 (von Braun, Gulati, and 
Orden 2004).  
Other work appeared on issues of considerable general interest to those interested in agricultural 
trade liberalization and development such as David Orden’s contribution to a highly regarded 
work with Josling and Roberts on food regulatory issues (Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004; 
Roberts, Josling, and Orden 2004). Further work was published on the food security theme 
tackled prominently by Diaz-Bonilla in the previous period (Díaz-Bonilla, Thomas, and 
Robinson 2004). Another significant stream of work was begun in this period on estimations of 
producer subsidy equivalents (PSEs) for key developing countries, with early results for India 
and China appearing a little later (Mullen et al. 2004) useful detailed analysis of the implications 
of China’s WTO accession was produced by Diao, Agapi, and Francis (2003) and Diao, Fan, and 
Zhang (2003).   
So while trade work continued to receive attention and valuable work was in train, whether 
consciously or not, the focus of IFPRI’s outputs seem to move away at least somewhat from the 
cut and thrust of the Doha negotiation issues. Part of the explanation may lie in staff changes and 
organizational reorganization which took place in this period with the establishment of a new 
Division (the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division [MTID]). A reading of the new 
Division’s first report on achievements and plans at the end of 2004, however, does seem to 
reflect a more methodologically oriented approach to research, with its focus on producing 
insights into questions which might have longer-term relevance, such as the PSE studies of India, 
Indonesia, China, and Vietnam, and a significant new stream of research on South Asian country 
studies than some of the more negotiation focused research subjects of the immediately earlier 
period. Other priorities at IFPRI, and particularly those associated with the attention given in the 
CGIAR network’s Science Council at the time to national market development issues like high 18 
value production and diversification, may also have had had the effect of reducing the attention 
accorded to trade work.  
Along with development advocacy groups, other international organizations were lifting their 
attention to Doha at this time, with the World Bank in particular making considerable efforts to 
highlight the issues at stake for developing countries. Some criticisms of the Bank’s lack of 
attention to differential impacts in different developing countries was sharpest in relation to 
statements made at this period, and Panagariya is particularly blunt in remarks about what he 
calls “fallacies” articulated by the Bank’s leadership (though not, he says by the Bank’s research 
staff) (Panagariya 2005). Putting those arguments to one side, what seems clear is a different 
assessment by the two organizations about the importance of engaging in the unfolding debate 
about agricultural liberalization and development playing out through the somewhat embattled 
Doha negotiations. 
Stumbling Blocks in the Search to Define Modalities—August 2004 to July 2006 
The so-called July Framework Agreement set the broad parameters within which the detail of the 
final Doha modalities would be determined through further specification, hoped for by the 
December 2005 Hong Kong Conference of the WTO. More than the Doha Mandate of 2001, the 
July 2004 framework text consciously reflected the limits to the level of ambition in a final 
agreement in circumstances where wide disparities in positions remained. Key elements were as 
follows. 
On market access, the most difficult of the pillars given the differences in views of members, the 
Framework adopted what was called a tiered approach to tariff reductions with progressive cuts 
within the tiers. Sensitive product provisions allowing lesser tariff cuts would be available to all 
members, so long as “substantial improvements” in access could be demonstrated, through the 
combination of tariff cuts and expansion. Special and differential treatment provisions broke new 
ground, with dispensation for developing countries from general commitments being allowed for 
special products “especially important for food security, livelihood security and rural 
development” and recourse was allowed to a new contingency measure called a special 
safeguard mechanism. Least-developed countries were exempted from reduction commitments 
and particular attention was to be given to tropical products, alternatives to illicit crops, 
preference erosion, and other development issues. 
On domestic support, the Framework also embraced a progressive tiered approach and required 
cuts both to bound levels of Amber Box and de Minimis support and to overall trade-distorting 
support (OTDS) comprising Amber Box, de Minimis and Blue Box Support. Down payment cuts 
of 20 percent were required from bound levels (in response to concerns about the degree of 
binding overhang) and further product specific reductions would be required. New disciplines 
were introduced with a cap at 5 percent of production value for Blue Box measures but following 
vigorous argument from the U.S., some loosening of Uruguay Round definitions was 
foreshadowed. Green box definitions were to be reviewed. Developing countries were accorded 
gentler cuts over longer periods. 
On export competition, the anticipated commitment to end all forms of export subsidies was 
given, by “a date to be agreed”, new disciplines were outlined limiting the length of export credit 19 
programs and some direction was provided for further negotiation on state trading enterprises 
and food aid.  
Reflecting the heightened development focus of the negotiation, some broad new commitments 
were made with reference to special and differential treatment provisions being effective in 
practice, allowing developing countries to meet their needs, especially in food security and rural 
development. More unusually, however, commodity-specific language was introduced providing 
a commitment to address cotton issues “ambitiously, expeditiously and specifically” with a sub-
committee to be set up to work on cotton aspects of all pillars in the negotiation. 
After this period of “negotiation to exhaustion,” the negotiations returned to more technical 
mode with sessions conducted generally monthly on the detailed definitional and other issues 
necessary to reach full agreement on modalities. A considerable amount of work was done on 
issues like the methodology to be used for establishing the ad valorem tariff equivalents of 
different forms of border protection. Although the July Framework had set a certain course for 
the final agreement, real tensions persisted over the final balance. Developing countries were 
looking for deep developed-country commitments in market access and domestic support but 
significant numbers of developing countries outside the LDC group were seeking broad 
exemptions from commitments on the grounds that developed countries had an obligation to 
move first. Equally, some of the agricultural exporting developing countries in the Cairns Group 
and G20 opposed dilution of the liberalizing impact of Doha by curtailing the expanded market 
access that could flow from south-south trade expansion, particularly into emerging economy 
markets. Most developing-country and Cairns Group members wanted to see deeper market 
access reductions than were favored by the EU and G10 and more far reaching domestic support 
cuts than the U.S. proposed. Other development issues also remained the subject of tensions. 
The Cotton Sub-Committee mandated under the Framework agreement was established in 
November 2004, only weeks after a WTO Panel found in favor of Brazil in its case against U.S. 
cotton subsidies and the prospect of wider resort to dispute action was in the atmosphere. This 
increased the emphasis being placed by developing countries and nongovernmental development 
advocates on the priority they felt should be given to big cuts in developed-country support 
measures, to some extent overshadowing market access concerns notwithstanding evidence from 
World Bank and others about the relative importance of the two pillars. In addition, with the 
expiry of the “peace clause” at the end of 2003, there was a growing disposition to tackle 
grievances through dispute settlement action, especially on the domestic subsidy front where 
cases were being brought under the general WTO provisions on subsidies. Overall, as the 
December 2005 Ministerial Conference loomed there was real concern about the state of play 
and risk of another stalemate and the recently appointed chair of the negotiations, Crawford 
Falconer, had a huge task on his hands. 
New proposals emerged from the US and the EU but the differences in emphasis remained, with 
the EU defensive on market access and the U.S. putting forward less far reaching domestic 
support cuts than key developing countries and some others were seeking. Just ahead of the 
Hong Kong Conference renewed attention was focused on the relative importance of the market 
access pillar compared with the other elements of the agriculture negotiation, with considerable 
interest and some controversy emerging from research released by the World Bank aimed at 
influencing the Hong Kong outcome (Newfarmer 2006). A key policy message from the World 
Bank was that market access was by far the most important element in the Doha outcome, that 20 
tariff cuts had to be deep to be effective, that exclusions for sensitive products had to be limited, 
a tariff cap would help and that it was in the interests of all countries, especially the world’s 
poor, for protection to be reduced in developing as well as high income countries.  
Ultimately a package of understandings was pulled together at the Hong Kong Conference 
enabling the round to be declared “back on track” with a new deadline of April 2006 for 
modalities. Few concessions were made, however, and tensions persisted in the background over 
how a meaningful agreement could be reached. There was some modest elaboration of aspects of 
the Framework, and agreement on an end date of 2013 for the elimination of export subsidies 
was the centre piece. The Conference devoted much effort to development aspects of the 
negotiation which had not been resolved, notably on cotton and a duty free quota free (DFQF) 
access commitment under consideration for LDCs and new language was agreed on both issues, 
though on the latter with the U.S. and some others unwilling to make unconstrained 
commitments. Deep divisions persisted, however, on market access provisions.  
Work resumed in 2006 but the going was hard. Chair Crawford Falconer released a new version 
of draft modalities in June 2006 (WTO document TNC/AG/W/3) which he acknowledged was 
not “an elegant document but a reflection of where we are” and noting that “there will never be 
any prospect of bridging differences if one does not have a sober and realistic view of them to 
begin with….”. This stark documentation of the persistent gaps on key issues was followed in 
June 2006 by a collapse of efforts towards agreement on modalities. Director General Lamy’s 
announce a suspension of the negotiations in July 2006. 
IFPRI’s Outputs—August 2004 to July 2006 
This period saw a progressive build up of IFPRI’s research outputs related to Doha following a 
quieter 2004–2005 period as the new organizational structure was settled down and significant 
staff changeovers occurred in the Markets, Trade, and Institutions Division. A broadly positive 
external evaluation of IFPRI’s trade economy-wide modeling work had been conducted by Kym 
Anderson during 2003 (Anderson 2003) but with the departure of Sherman Robinson and 
Eugenio Diaz-Bonilla, who had led much of IFPRI’s global trade analysis in the previous few 
years, IFPRI’s in-house global CGE modeling capacity was effectively put on hold for a period. 
Attention to global trade impact assessment work was revived with vigor, however, after the 
appointment of Senior Research Fellow, Antoine Bouët, in February 2005. He produced a 
significant article during that year along with French researchers Bureau, Decreux, and Jean 
from CEPII and INRA, which drew out sharp contrasts between developing countries in terms of 
the effects they would experience from global trade liberalization (Bouët et al. 2005). The 
authors challenged the excessively optimistic assessments of earlier mainstream CGE modeling 
of benefits to developing countries from trade liberalization included in widely cited World Bank 
research (World Bank 2004).   
In what marked a significant breakthrough in the quality and detail of data used to simulate trade 
effects, and using the August 2004 Doha Framework agreement as a basis, the authors set out to 
improve the way existing agricultural trade distortions and circumstances were captured. They 
incorporated more precisely than had been done previously existing trade preferences, regional 
agreements, the gaps between applied and bound protection, more accurate assessment of 
specific rate tariffs, details of various domestic support measures and, importantly, they 21 
distinguished between groups of developing countries through more precise specification of their 
agricultural production and trade profiles. While in many respects the modeling approach used 
by Bouët et al. paralleled other efforts, the significant improvement in data produced through 
their MAcMap data base, led to a material reduction in estimation of welfare gains for 
developing countries, noting that some would actually experience a loss in welfare. The article 
acknowledged the impact on some developing countries of preference erosion and the possible 
damaging impact of agricultural price increases on some net food importing developing countries 
but argued that exemption from commitments by all developing countries was not an appropriate 
solution and that more targeted approaches should be adopted to deal with welfare losses in those 
developing countries so affected.  
This work captured the attention of researchers and had a significant impact, not least through 
the decision in the following year by the GTAP consortium to incorporate the MAcMaps data. It 
has been widely accepted and used in the profession since that time and has been valued for the 
precision and richness with which global trade distortions and developing-country agricultural 
economies have been represented. The MAcMaps data incorporated into GTAP was used, for 
example, by the World Bank in studies conducted from 2005 and Anderson and Martin (2006) 
note that the new 6.05 version of the GTAP database “is a major improvement over the previous 
version for several reasons ….” A description of the MAcMaps database was published in Bouët, 
Decreux, Fontagne, Jean, and Laborde in December 2004. During 2006, as negotiators struggled 
to agree on Doha modalities, further work was done by Bouët and others using the richer 
analytical material they had been developing to illuminate key issues at the heart of battles under 
way in Geneva.   
In the wake of considerable interest in the reduced estimates of welfare gains for developing 
countries through Doha, Bouët produced a piece using the Mirage model and MAcMap data on 
“opening the black box” which elaborated and explained clearly the reasons for the differences in 
outcomes among the best known modeling work, with the World Bank and others as reference 
cases (Bouët 2006a and 2006b). Consistent with IFPRI’s longstanding market orientation, Bouët 
nevertheless concluded that even though lower, estimated benefits from liberalization for 
developing countries were positive, and would be more so with appropriate complementary 
policies. Moreover, trade reform through Doha needed to be very ambitious to have a positive 
development impact, including through liberalization of agriculture in developing countries. A 
parallel exercise to explain the reasons behind differences in modeled assessments of Doha 
scenarios was also produced by the World Bank’s Dominique van der Mensbrugghe (2006) who 
identified similar factors to those cited by Bouët and others. Interestingly, since GTAP’s 
incorporation of the MAcMap database, differences between modeled estimates of the impact of 
various Doha trade liberalization scenarios have narrowed appreciably. 
While this work attracted considerable interest among researchers (see Section VI of this Report 
for supporting evidence through citations) and policy advisors who followed leading research, 
IFPRI’s attention also turned more directly to the negotiating environment at a time of growing 
anxiety about continuing drift and a sense that members were not prepared to bring much more 
to the table. Bouët, Mevel, and Orden produced two incisive pieces in research briefing format 
arguing for a more ambition in the negotiating outcome and calling for two specific 
improvements to developed-country offers which could have meaningful positive benefits for the 
poorest developing countries. The two proposed adjustments were for developed countries all to 22 
commit to 100 percent duty free and quota free (DFQF) access for agricultural and 
manufacturing tariff lines for LDCS as proposed by the EU and for the number of sensitive and 
special products exempted from formula cuts to be limited to 1 percent as proposed by the U.S. 
(Bouët, Mevel, and Orden 2006a and 2006b).  
This work saw IFPRI engaged at least as actively and directly in producing material aimed at 
influencing the Doha negotiations as it had been around the time of Cancun. Others too began to 
lift the level of their involvement with numerous contributions from the World Bank. A well-
publicized study from the Carnegie endowment in March 2006 (Polaski 2006) lent support for 
the more defensive approach that had been adopted by many developing countries in the 
negotiations. This study generated intense interest in Geneva and from development advocacy 
groups. 
In addition to the impact assessment work and commentary on negotiating options, several other 
noteworthy contributions on agricultural trade liberalization were produced by IFPRI in this 
period. Earlier work by Minot and Daniels (2005) on cotton and rural poverty in Benin was 
published in the Journal of Agricultural Economics and the approach used in that important 
research of linking global price adjustments with rural household survey data was adopted in 
further work by Orden, Salam, Dewina, Nazli, and Minot (2006). This study also showed 
dramatic positive results with an estimated reduction poverty in Pakistan of 1.939 million people 
from a 20 percent rise in cotton prices. 
Other strands of IFPRI country-specific trade analysis warrant mention from this period. The 
first is work by Cororaton, Cockburn, and Corong on Doha scenarios, trade reforms, and poverty 
in the Philippines, which played to IFPRI’s strengths in high quality assessment combining 
detailed knowledge of the agriculture sector of a specific country with global scenario 
assessment and maintaining a clear focus on poverty reduction (Cororaton, Cockburn, and 
Corong 2005; Cororaton and Cockburn 2006). While not so directly related to Doha, work by 
Diao and others on the implications and impact of China’s WTO accession offered revealing 
insights relevant to China’s involvement in the Doha process (Tuan, Somwaru, and Diao 2006; 
Zhang 2006). Similarly, work by Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005) on agricultural policies and 
PSE estimates for India produced a richly detailed understanding of Indian agricultural policies 
and challenges, relevant to understanding the more active role India was playing by this time in 
the Doha process. 
In short, IFPRI was now reestablished as a significant contributor to Doha relevant research and 
was active both at the “real time” level of the negotiations at a highly precarious point in their 
evolution, and at the level of detailed research relevant to longer-term policy reform. 
Resumption of Negotiations and Efforts to Finalize—August 2006 to July 2008 
After a further hiatus in the negotiations, behind-the-scenes engagements between key players 
eventually facilitated the climate for a resumption of efforts to take Doha through to conclusion. 
Chair Crawford Falconer issued a “challenges paper” in April 2007 which contained some blunt 
messages for members about where the center of gravity might lie for a compromise agreement. 
He changed his arm at some breakthrough ideas on the most difficult elements of the negotiation, 
putting into words what most hard-headed observers and participants in the Doha round had 
privately acknowledged for a long time. In effect he was calling for the U.S. to offer more by 23 
way of domestic subsidy cuts so as to commit to a cut to below its actual spending; for the EU, 
Japan, and others to agree to deeper tariff cuts, but at lesser levels than being called for by the 
G20; and for special and sensitive product and safeguard provisions to be resolved with more 
modest deviations from general formula cuts than being sought by major proponents. In a 
constructive contribution, Falconer also mused about the merits of developing countries 
abandoning some of the complex and difficult debate about special flexibilities of various sorts 
and reverting instead to a simple Uruguay Round average tariff cut approach along the lines of 
the suggestion put forward in the World Bank’s pre-Hong Kong Conference publication. As 
noted in the influential Bridges publication (Volume 11, No. 152, May 2007), there had been 
circular argument in the months after the Hong Kong Conference played out mainly between the 
US, the EU, and India about who needed to move first to break the impasse on an achievable 
deal.  
Failure at an informal meeting in Potsdam in June 2007 to crunch through a deal among the G4 
(US, EU, Brazil, and India), with Australia and Japan (by then styled collectively the G6) in the 
wings, cast a bleak shadow but ultimately Falconer’s efforts bore fruit as the negotiation 
resumed. By July 2007 he was able to release a further revised modalities draft. Negotiations 
once again moved into an intense phase with all alert to the time pressure associated with the 
U.S. electoral cycle. Developing countries were not persuaded by the chair’s cut through 
suggestion about reverting to a simple tariff cut and the focus in Geneva, mainly through  
“Room E” meetings of a group of 37 delegations in which all the key negotiating groups were 
represented (US, EU, G20, G33, Cairns, Africa, ACP, small and vulnerable economies,  
Cotton-4, tropical products group, recent and new members). The critical issues in play were the 
same stumbling blocks that had stymied agreement from the outset. Key details of the tariff 
cutting formula, TRQ expansion, sensitive and special product and safeguard issues, trade 
distorting support formula cut details, blue box provisions, development flexibilities, cotton, and 
so on. The process continued at perhaps its most serious pace since the launch through the rest of 
2007. 
A further revised text was released in February 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1) and subsequent 
negotiations made progress particularly on a framework for tariff rate quota expansion for 
sensitive products under the so-called “partial designation” approach allowing a limited number 
of tariff lines to be declared sensitive. Gaps in some other areas (especially on domestic support 
and export competition) were also narrowed but market access provisions for developing 
countries (Special Products and the Special Safeguard Mechanism) remained difficult. Work was 
also still needed on tropical products and the tariff preference erosion issue. 
Another revision of the modalities text was issued in May 2008 (TN/AG/W/4/Rev 2), putting the 
negotiations within sight of conclusion. The text was revised once again on 10 July 2008 ahead 
of a Ministerial-level meeting which began later that month. This time Falconer included 
additional detail on tariff and domestic support reductions, including more elaborated special and 
differential treatment provisions for developing countries which dealt with some of the most 
disputed issues such as tropical products and preference erosion. Specific provisions were also 
set out for an unprecedented number of groups of developing countries in response to their 
arguments for special exemptions from the general formulas. These included not only Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs) and Recently Acceded Members (RAMs) but also a new group of 
Very Recently Acceded Members (VRAMs), Small and Vulnerable Economies (SVEs), and 24 
more. In some cases, competing versions of the text were also included to focus negotiators’ 
attention on the remaining the gaps.  
During the late July session, Director General Lamy worked closely with Chairs of negotiating 
groups and the General Council and a group of Ministers from seven actively involved members 
(Australia, Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the US) as well as a larger group of some 30 
members in the Green Room format. Over nine days of intense negotiation these smaller groups 
reported almost daily to the full membership. On 25 July, Lamy had sufficient confidence that a 
deal could be brokered to put out an informal proposal which covered key outstanding issues in 
agriculture and NAMA. After some seven years and over 200 hours of formal negotiations the 
effort ultimately foundered, ostensibly over differences in the small group of seven members 
between the U.S. on one hand and India (with Chinese support) on the other over the degree of 
permissiveness for developing countries to raise tariffs in the event of import surges under the 
Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). While agreement was close on most elements of the SSM 
provisions, the U.S. was not prepared to accept the possibility of pre-Doha tariff bindings being 
breached in the context of import surges while India insisted this was essential. It is likely that 
had the issue been debated in the fully membership, India would have garnered broader support 
from some other developing-country members while the U.S. position would likely have 
attracted support from other developed and developing members. In the wake of the failure on 
the SSM issue a small number of other matters still in dispute such as the treatment of cotton 
were not formally broached. Nevertheless, of over a hundred critical issues of difference between 
members at the start of the last phase of negotiations it was surprising to many observers that the 
process collapsed on a relatively minor aspect of only one of these issues. 
Unlike the situation after the failed Cancun meeting, WTO members were relatively calm and 
muted in the aftermath of the failure in Geneva in July 2008. Lamy suspended negotiations 
saying “no one was throwing in the towel” and “the dust needed to settle a little before further 
steps were decided”. Some informal dialogue has taken place subsequently but there appear to be 
low expectations of negotiations resuming in 2008 and many expect this will not be possible 
before 2010 given electoral cycles in both the U.S. and India. 
Disappointment over the latest failure to conclude the Doha negotiations has been sharpest 
among the agricultural exporting countries, both developed and developing, which have been 
most strongly committed to the process from the outset. Surprisingly strong rebukes were also 
issued by some smaller developing countries, including some with interests in tropical products 
and cotton who expected the texts in play to have generated meaningful benefits. More clearly 
than at any previous point in the WTO negotiating process, the sharpness of differences among 
developing countries has been evident, in some respects overshadowing traditional north-south 
cleavages and raising questions about the viability of the G20 as a continuing force in the 
process.  
It remains to be seen whether the work accomplished up to the point of suspension, including the 
informal Lamy proposal, can be preserved in the event that negotiations resume. And while there 
is reasonable confidence that the existing WTO rules framework remains solidly intact, questions 
are being asked about whether the organization in its current form can be expected to make any 
further progress with comprehensive liberalizing rounds of negotiations.  25 
IFPRI’s Outputs—August 2006 to July 2008 
IFPRI’s active tracking of developments in the negotiations and production of research 
contributions aimed at influencing their outcome continued in late 2006 and through July 2008. 
Again, the focus was squarely on the interests of developing countries, and especially those 
which had not always been at the forefront of analysis or negotiator attention in the past. A 
number of IFPRI reports were produced in collaboration or were commissioned by development-
oriented think tanks or advocacy groups including the Hewlett Foundation, the German Marshall 
Fund, and Bread for the World. Again, also, work by Bouët and others at IFPRI brought 
compelling evidence to bear on the realities of the different circumstances of developing 
countries, and argued, against the background of a realistic appreciation of the state of the Doha 
round, for adjustments to negotiating proposals which would have positive impacts on both 
global growth and welfare and as much as possible, on the poorest of the developing countries.   
Examples of this work include the chapter on preference erosion by Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean 
(2006) in the World Bank’s book on Agricultural trade Reform and Doha. The preference 
erosion question had continued as a difficult challenge in the Doha process and for development 
oriented commentators. This issue had been put squarely on the table in Geneva, especially by 
the ACP group of African, Caribbean, and Pacific countries concerned especially about their 
post-Doha prospects in the EU market. Other developing countries seeking opportunities to 
compete in Europe took a different view and more generally, some were concerned that high 
protection industrialized countries were shielding domestic interests through arguments about the 
development implications of reform. The article by Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean tackled the issue 
head on, elaborated the likely impacts, and concluded that concerns about preference erosion 
were real, but that the policy response should not be the status quo. It explored alternatives, 
including ‘aid for trade’ initiatives, but also pointed to nonagricultural opportunities in the Doha 
negotiation such as DFQF access for LDCs and simplified rules of origin in textiles and clothing. 
Other useful material directed towards the negotiators appeared in 2007 with two products from 
Berisha-Krasniqi and Bouët (Berisha-Krasniqi and Bouët 2007a and 2007b) bringing forward the 
results of updated analysis and underlining the importance of getting the details right in 
agreement which would be of benefit to all. Again, IFPRI stressed the importance of ambition in 
agricultural trade reform and liberalization in services as well as trade facilitation to generate 
sufficient welfare benefits overall. The authors also underlined the importance of complementary 
aid for trade and other measures to assist the most negatively affected developing countries and 
those likely to struggle with transition to new trade realities. 
IFPRI’s attention turned specifically to the issue of agricultural trade reform and Africa’s trade 
performance in work by Bora, Bouët, and Roy (2007) and Bouët, Berisha-Krasniqi, Mevel, and 
Sade (2005) de-constructing the detailed and varied market access opportunities available to 
different African countries and using a gravity model to assess the impact of infrastructure. 
Again, it concludes that generally speaking Africa’s market access is good but enhanced 
preferential opportunities could be important and aid for trade solutions focused on infrastructure 
could be very important in helping some African countries cope with supply-side constraints. 
Other detailed work on the Near East and North Africa was produced in 2007 by IFPRI in 
collaboration with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) (Minot and 
Daniels 2005). The report compares the effects of multilateral liberalization with the gains from 26 
bilateral trade agreements with the EU and US for 13 countries of this region, most of whom are 
net importers of agricultural products: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, 
Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, the West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen. It concluded 
that multilateral liberalization generally resulted in net gains (especially when in combination 
with macroeconomic reforms) and generally were greater than those from bilateral agreements, 
including within the region.  
A major study by Orden Cheng, Nguyen, Grote, Thomas, Mullen, and Sun, drawing together the 
results of the PSE estimates for India, Indonesia, China, and Vietnam was published, reflecting 
important work over several years and offering important and detailed insights into the 
agricultural economies and trade prospects of these countries (Orden et al. 2007). Orden’s work 
on U.S. farm policies was also progressed in this period with the publication of a paper 
elaborating a concept of buyout program for the heavily subsidized U.S. sugar industry. In view 
of the continuing criticism in Doha over the U.S. offer on domestic support and the lack of 
ambition evident in Congressional debate about a new farm bill, this work attracted significant 
attention. 
The more activist trade agenda in IFPRI’s work program continued into 2008. A contribution of 
note, which had been some years in development, was a book by Anwarul Hoda, a former WTO 
Deputy Director General, and Ashok Gulati, IFPRI’s Delhi-based Asia Director, which traces 
Doha’s origins and progress and draws out opportunities for developing countries (Hoda and 
Gulati 2008). It elaborates India’s situation in considerable detail but also assesses those of other 
major participants (US, EU, Cairns Group, and G33 countries), concluding with some suggested 
negotiating approaches for developing countries. The work took account of Doha developments 
through to 2006 and provides useful background material and thoughtful analysis and 
commentary on the circumstances and perspectives of developing countries, especially India. 
Papers prepared by IFPRI staff in two significant projects in March 2008 directly targeted Doha 
negotiators as they are grappling with efforts to settle a final outcome for the Round. 
The first was a group of papers co-authored by David Laborde with other leading experts at a 
Conference in Geneva in March 2008 jointly organized by IFPRI, ICTSD, and IFAP with the 
papers subsequently published by ICTSD (Blandford, Laborde, and Martin 2008; Gopinath and 
Laborde 2008; Jean, Josling, and Laborde 2008). These papers assessed the impact of the May 
2008 Falconer draft agriculture modalities text on key participants in the negotiations. Laborde’s 
work with others covered the US, the EU, and India while others covered Brazil.  
Insights from this work drew on expert knowledge of the progressively more complex provisions 
appearing in the draft Doha negotiating texts and methodologies which were being refined in 
collaboration, for example with World Bank staff, for estimating how particular countries would 
act, for example in relation to special and sensitive product exemptions, to give effect to Doha 
outcomes. The results for India were of great interest given the pivotal role it was playing in the 
negotiations. Gopinath and Laborde concluded that with the flexibilities available to India it was 
unlikely that any reductions would be required from its existing applied tariffs unless it offered 
duty free quota free access to LDCs. They also concluded that India would have ample flexibility 
under existing policy settings to continue its domestic support arrangements. Gopinath and 
Laborde’s work on impacts for the US and the EU were also of real value at this stage of the 
negotiation, putting into clear focus and with a high degree of credibility and objectivity, the 27 
implications of proposals on the table. This timely contribution helped other WTO members, 
especially from developing countries, make judgments about what might be possible in the end 
game. 
The second key contribution in 2008 was made by Orden and others through a series of papers 
for a Conference organized by IFPRI in March 2008, in this case dealing only with the WTO’s 
domestic support provisions. Orden presented the case for closer scrutiny of member country 
notifications as a cross check on whether WTO obligations are being met and given delays in 
notifications, devised “shadow” data to assess developments. A forward-looking approach was 
adopted including a discussion of alternative support definitions. Orden (with Blandford) then 
treated the U.S. in detail and Cororaton covered the Philippines. 
A separate publication by Laborde (ICTSD 2008) produced a timely follow on from earlier 
IFPRI work with Bouët and others on duty free quota free (DFQF) access for LDCs. It 
demonstrated convincingly that the possible exclusion by developed countries of 3 percent of 
their tariff lines under this provision in the draft modalities text would severely undermine the 
benefits for many LDCs given export product concentration and the effects of preference 
erosion. The paper went on to demonstrate how significantly LDCs would benefit if the major 
emerging economies offered them DFQF access as they were encouraged to do in the draft texts 
since the Hong Kong Ministerial meeting. In the case of these emerging economies, unlike the 
case for developed countries, meaningful benefits for LDCs were assessed to result even from 
provision of DFQF access for 97 percent of tariff lines. 
Laborde also collaborated with World Bank authors, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe, in a very 
useful assessment of the implications of the May 2008 draft Agriculture and NAMA modalities 
texts on developing countries (Laborde, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe 2008). It was one of 
the most comprehensive evaluations produced, taking account of the myriad flexibilities being 
proposed for various groups of WTO members, particularly developing countries. Combining the 
impacts of both the agriculture and NAMA provisions the authors were able to produce an 
authoritative assessment of the likely value of the liberalization implied, ultimately concluding 
the gains would be worthwhile for developing countries despite the fact that flexibilities 
substantially eroded the outcome. 
By July 2008, IFPRI’s engagement in debate and analysis relevant to the Doha negotiations had 
well and truly recovered from the flat period from 2004 to 2005. IFPRI’s publications, and work 
its staff were doing in collaboration with highly regarded researchers and institutions (the World 
Bank, ICTSD), have had the effect of recovering and building on IFPRI’s standing as a valuable 
source of agricultural trade research, well pitched to the complexity and rhythm of real time 
Doha negotiations. 
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IV.  VALUING IFPRI’S DOHA RESEARCH:  
CHALLENGES AND APPROACHES 
Assessing the impact of policy-related research and related activity presents significant 
methodological challenges and has received considerable attention in the CGIAR network and 
indeed through research efforts of IFPRI itself with contributions like the volume by Pardey and 
Smith entitled “What’s Economics Worth?” (2004). In that book, Bruce Gardner contributes a 
chapter (pp. 201–222) which comments directly on efforts to value research contributions to 
trade liberalization, and notes the plausibility of the view that agricultural economists’ 
assessments of the welfare benefits of liberalization have had substantial considering the policy 
changes that have occurred in response to anticipated social benefits. He notes, equally, that the 
work of economists who have argued against trade liberalization must be included on the cost 
side.  
An unavoidable dilemma in this area, however, is the absence of a settled consensus on the net 
welfare benefits measured in GDP terms of various trade liberalization scenarios and indeed a 
substantial part of the contribution of IFPRI’s Doha work has been to refine and disaggregate the 
estimated net benefits (or costs) of different liberalization scenarios. Even at the low end of the 
range, the estimated potential benefits are very substantial, with IFPRI’s estimates falling in the 
range of between $158 billion for full global liberalization in agriculture to $41 billion for an 
unambitious Doha scenario (Berisha-Krasniqi and Bouët 2007a). As elaborated in Bouët’s 2006 
comparative analysis published as an IFPRI Research Brief, however, the implied world welfare 
increase estimates in various studies by a factor of ten from 0.3 percent of Hertel and Keeney 
(2005) to 3.1 percent of Dessus, Fukasaku, and Safadi (1999). IFPRI’s own estimates are at the 
lower end of that range at 0.33 percent. Similarly, Bouët (2006) cites estimates of the number of 
people lifted out of poverty varying from 72 million to 440 million, or a factor of six. In addition 
to generating estimates for global welfare increases, IFPRI’s development and poverty reduction 
mission suggests the attention it has rightly given to disaggregating the impacts from trade 
liberalization scenarios to illuminate the situations of individual and groups of developing 
countries. Here again the results vary considerably, and as noted in the previous Section, IFPRI 
and others acknowledge that some developing countries would be net losers from further 
agricultural trade reform. A particular contribution IFPRI researchers can be considered to have 
made is to have narrowed somewhat the range of generally accepted estimates through their 
contribution to the development of the highly regarded and now widely used MAcMaps 
database. 
While estimates from IFPRI and other peer reviewed researchers could be taken as a guide to 
potential benefits from Doha, less the cost involved in producing the research, it seems counter-
intuitive to value IFPRI’s work less to the extent that it produces estimates of benefits that are 
lower than those of researchers. (The cost of producing IFPRI’s Doha-related outputs is outlined 
later in this Section of the Report.) 
As well as uncertainty about the scale of benefits from trade liberalization, there is a complex 
and lengthy pathway from producing research outputs, to informing and influencing the political 
decisionmaking process and finally to making of policy decisions which produce growth and 
development outcomes. Some studies, including that by Jere Behrman (2007) have tackled this 
conundrum with an impressive degree of rigor. Using a quantitative benefit cost framework as 30 
well as interviews with key decisionmakers, Behrman attempts to determine the extent of 
influence of an IFPRI program evaluation of Mexico’s PROGRESA program and is able to reach 
informative conclusions about the value of IFPRI’s evaluation in the case of one specific piece of 
IFPRI’s research. 
By comparison, the IFPRI contributions under consideration in this report include over one 
hundred research products and 11 examples of trade-related capacity building or training activity 
over the relevant period. Moreover, the Doha negotiations involved, by the end of July 2008, 
some 150 member governments with a vast array of actors in both the public and private sectors 
participating in production of research materials, commentary and advocacy in support of 
particular negotiating options. There is a wealth of commentary about the motivations and 
influences in play before the 2001 launch of the Doha negotiations and in the years during which 
they have been in train, some of which was reflected in Section III of the Report. Isolating the 
work of IFPRI from others on the decisions of the vast numbers of relevant actor cannot be done 
with precision. Despite considerable public commentary on the negotiating process and a 
relatively transparent negotiating environment which provides for the public release of many 
relevant documents and position papers, the balance of influences on member governments is not 
often revealed. And since the Doha negotiations remain to be concluded, the impact of IFPRI 
(and other) research on actual decisions and their resultant development outcomes will not be 
fully discernable until a considerable time after the outcome is decided and implemented. 
In these circumstances, alternative approaches were adopted to assessing the value of IFPRI’s 
Doha contributions. The “Strategic Framework for Impact” used by IFPRI in its internal 
planning and evaluation processes provides a useful graphical illustration (see below) of the 
conceptual approach the organization takes to understanding and targeting the impact of its work 
(see Figure 1).    
This approach pays specific attention to IFPRI’s research products, its capacity-building activity 
and its policy communications as vehicles for impact and identifies contact from partners and 
stakeholders as important influences on the development of the organization’s research and other 
activities. IFPRI outputs are directed to policymakers both directly and through two-way 
exchanges with media and opinion leaders with the aim of influencing policies, and through 
policy influence, to have positive impacts on poor people. 
Bearing in mind the constraints to isolating impact in relation to a complex endeavor like the 
Doha trade round, this Report has relied significantly on efforts to draw out direct and indirect 
evidence of IFPRI’s impact on key parties identified in the organization’s strategic framework 
and where possible to trace pathways to policy influence. IFPRI’s own intentions and 
expectations of its trade-related work program were explored in discussions with 18 relevant 
current or formers of staff (see Appendix VI). A major endeavor was then made to extract 
informed opinion about IFPRI’s research and capacity-strengthening work through a survey and 
interviews directed at key parties involved in or associated with the Doha process (see Section 
V). Detailed research was also undertaken to gather data on citations and media reporting on 
IFPRI’s research products related to Doha (see Section VI).  
The discussion above suggests that a straightforward benefit: cost analysis approach to 
evaluating impact is fraught in relation to activities related to multilateral trade reform.  31 
There are complications in measuring benefits with precision but difficulties were also 
encountered in measuring the costs of producing IFPRI’s Doha-related research and capacity-
building contributions. The research products (over one hundred in number) were produced in 
different areas of the organization and the key division covering trade research underwent 
reorganization during the review period. Costing information for these specific subsets of outputs 
was not easily accessible and it was agreed with IFPRI’s management that the effort required to 
trace these costs outweighed the benefits of their inclusion in this report.  
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V.  VIEWS OF KEY STAKEHOLDERS ON IFPRI’S WORK  
ON THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS 
Interviews and Surveys of Key Stakeholders 
An e-based survey was sent to around 114 targeted respondents from five key groups seeking 
views on the quality, usefulness and impact of IFPRI’s Doha research and capacity-strengthening 
activities. (The survey questions are reproduced at Appendix I and the list of respondents, 
identified by position and presented according to target group is at Appendix II)  
Responses were received electronically or through telephone or personal interview with the 
author of this report, either in or from Washington DC or during visits made to Geneva and Paris 
during February 2008. Of those contacted, 81 responses were received and among these, 64 
included responses to questions seeking rankings of IFPRI’s work. Of the total number of 81 
survey responses, 30 were received through direct emailed replies and 51 resulted from 
telephone or personal interview. This personal contact was undertaken in follow-up efforts to 
ensure an adequate response rate to the survey questions and to allow for broader questioning of 
some respondents. 
The five key groups of respondents were as follows: 
•  academic researchers with considerable expertise in agricultural trade liberalization and 
well placed to comment on the quality and influence of IFPRI’s work;  
•  government officials from a broad range of WTO member governments, including 
influential players in each of the most active member government groups in the process 
(G20, G33, Cairns Group, Africa Group, and others) and some holding significant 
responsibilities, for example, the Doha negotiations chairs of agriculture, rules and 
TRIPS, and the General Council of the WTO;  
•  very high-level and expert staff from the major international organizations involved or 
associated with Doha including the Director General and senior staff of the WTO, key 
trade and agriculture staff of the World Bank, the Director of Trade and Agriculture and 
senior agriculture staff at the OECD, and staff of the Economic Commission for Africa;  
•  senior staff from well-regarded think tanks and nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) with an active interest and work program in the Doha negotiations; and 
•  specialist staff from business and legal firms with an interest in the Doha outcome. 
Views on IFPRI’s Research Products 
Results of the survey rankings on IFPRI’s research products are presented below and are broken 
down according to the five categories of respondents. Any respondent who indicated that he or 
she was not very familiar with IFPRI’s research on Doha was filtered out of the survey and not 
asked to complete these rankings. Even where such an indication was given in telephone or 
personal interview with the author of this report, illuminating comment was often provided on 
relevant issues, including the question of how IFPRI’s work could be enhanced for greater 
impact and these have been taken into account as relevant. 33 
Figure 2.  Overall ranking of usefulness 
 
 
Figure 3.  Overall ranking of quality 
 
Overall, there was a very positive response from respondents on both the usefulness and quality 
of IFPRI’s work. Some 56 percent ranked it as useful or really useful and 44 percent ranked it as 
somewhat useful. No respondent described IFPRI’s work as not very useful (Figure 2). On 
quality, 55 percent described IFPRI’s work as extremely high, 42 percent as moderately high and 
3 percent described it as not very high quality (Figure 3).  
There was some variation, however, in rankings according to category of respondent with those 
from think tanks and NGOs attributing the highest rankings to IFPRI’s work with 86 percent 
declaring it to be useful or really useful and 77 percent declaring it to be of extremely high 













quality than the average with 64 percent declaring it to be useful or really useful and 60 percent 
of them regarding it as of extremely high quality. By comparison, respondents from international 
organizations were more inclined to rank IFPRI’s Doha work as somewhat useful (70 percent) 
than useful or really useful (30 percent) and on quality ranked IFPRI’s work at slightly lower 
than the average response. Business and legal respondents (although small in number) also 
ranked lower than the average (Figures 4 and 5).  
Figure 4.  Ranking of usefulness by category of respondents (in percent) 
 
 

































Extremely High Moderately High Not Very High35 
Rankings from government officials were of particular interest and must be weighted heavily in 
this exercise since these are the most direct actors in the Doha process and arguably have the 
greatest opportunity to influence the shape of the outcome and its associated development 
impact. The results for this group were, however, below the average attributed to IFPRI’s work 
in terms of usefulness and quality (with 36 percent and 42 percent respectively according 
IFPRI’s work the highest rankings compared with the average scores of 56 percent and 54 
percent). Interestingly, also, among the 21 people interviewed or surveyed in the government-
officials category, a relatively low percentage (67 percent compared with 80 percent of all 
respondents) considered themselves sufficiently familiar with IFPRI work to participate in the 
ranking process. Qualitative comment gleaned at interview reinforced the indication that IFPRI’s 
work is less well known and regarded in government circles than in the research and public 
policy or advocacy communities. A number of otherwise well-informed senior negotiators stated 
that they rarely saw IFPRI product in either electronic or hard copy format. 
Other relevant information gleaned from survey responses included that research from all 
sources, as well as specifically from IFPRI, which was judged to be the most useful or 
influential. By a very significant margin, respondents in all categories described research from 
the World Bank as having had the greatest impact and/or value in the Doha negotiations. A clear 
majority of respondents in all categories cited World Bank materials as the most influential 
research, especially its modeling of estimated benefits from liberalization and later work 
assessing poverty impacts of trade liberalization. Most indicated a strong positive regard for this 
work though many respondents noted the progressive refinement of World Bank estimates of 
benefits from agricultural trade liberalization which had the effect of reducing the expected net 
welfare benefits. Some respondents noted that optimistic early estimates from the World Bank 
and others had some negative effects on the negotiating process by engendering cynicism and 
undermining the impetus for reform.  
Many respondents indicated a strong appreciation for IFPRI’s work for having been more 
attentive from the outset of the Doha process about potential negative consequences for some 
developing countries or some vulnerable groups within developing countries from various trade 
liberalization scenarios and thus producing results which made intuitive sense. Against the 
background of more negative sentiment about trade liberalization, especially in developing 
countries and development advocacy groups (see Section III of the report), a large number of 
respondents specifically remarked on the high standing and credibility of IFPRI’s work. 
Comments included that IFPRI “presented its work objectively,” “doesn’t take sides,” was 
“prepared to revisit issues when its research threw up different conclusions from its earlier 
work,” and “didn’t shy away from conclusions which might not be popular.” On quality, 
comments included remarks like “IFPRI’s research is up there with other influential work on the 
round” and from one active NGO group “we find IFPRI’s work very credible even when we 
don’t agree with its conclusions”. 
Apart from material from the World Bank, research which attracted frequent comment included 
contributions from individual academic researchers with the GTAP project at Purdue receiving a 
number of positive references and the work of Hertel, Sumner, Josling, Winters, and Thompson 
mentioned by many.  
While not matching the World Bank’s research for impact, IFPRI’s work was generally seen by 
respondents as falling into in the same category of influence as that from other well-known 36 
institutions with global membership or reach including the OECD and, less often, the FAO, 
UNCTAD. A number of respondents, especially from governments and international 
organizations cited research from institutions with established impact in particular regions or 
negotiating groups. These included ICONE in Brazil, ABARE in Australia, CEPII in France, and 
the USDA’s Economic Research Service. The International Center for Trade and Sustainable 
Development (ICTSD) and its widely read Bridges newsletter, attracted frequent comment for 
influence and reliability especially from government officials and respondents from think tanks 
and NGOs. Oxfam and the Carnegie Endowment also attracted considerable comment and to a 
somewhat lesser extent, materials from the International Food and Trade Policy Research 
Council (IPC), the Hewlett Foundation, and the German Marshall Fund.  
A number of government respondents commented that in-house research materials tailored to 
their specific national interests in the negotiations but not released publicly had played a very 
significant part in the evolution of their negotiating positions in the Doha round. Some 
developing-country representatives who expressed this view said such material had not been 
available in previous trade negotiations but that new investment in internal research capability 
had changed the way they operated. Some research materials of this kind had been circulated 
within Geneva-based negotiating groups such as Cairns and G20 and analysis from Agriculture 
Canada was mentioned by some as very useful. 
Of IFPRI’s research materials, there was reasonable consistency among categories of 
respondents about what had been the most influential or useful. Impact assessments of Doha 
scenarios were very commonly cited as useful with most respondents referring to work over the 
last two or three years based on the Mirage model and the MAcMaps database. Particular 
recognition was given to work by Bouët’s opening up the “black box” of trade modeling and 
IFPRI work on trade preferences, preference erosion, and the DFQF access for LDCs issue. 
Many respondents also referred to IFPRI’s earlier work on the “development box” and food-
security typology analysis by Diaz-Bonilla and others. Orden’s work on U.S. agricultural 
policies attracted frequent positive comment from all groups. Among academic researchers and 
government officials, IFPRI’s work on PSEs in developing countries was identified as of high 
value although some respondents took issue with the methodological approach IFPRI had taken 
on exchange rate misalignment in relation to PSE estimation. Respondents across all groups 
commented positively about the quality and value of IFPRI’s country- and commodity-specific 
trade impact analysis with the cotton study on Benin and subsequent work on Pakistan 
mentioned in particular. More generally, a number of respondents identified elements of IFPRI’s 
2020 Vision work, including market projections, as of high overall value.  
Views on IFPRI’s Capacity-Strengthening and Training Activities 
Limited information was gathered in survey and interview responses about the quality and value 
of IFPRI’s capacity building work (see Appendix VII for the list of those activities). In the 
relevant period for this report, IFPRI’s trade-related training and associated activities were 
conducted in Indonesia, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Senegal, Peru, Kenya, and 
Tanzania as well as a session held in Washington DC. A detailed assessment of their individual 
value and impact is beyond the scope of this report but information made available by IFPRI 
reveals that a central element in the workshops and training was the development and use of 
CGE modeling tools. Most of the course elements ran for between two and four weeks and 37 
involved participants from both government ministries and research institutions. Course work 
commonly involved practical exercises which applied these analytical tools to prominent policy 
issues in play in those countries. Recent examples have included the preparation during the 
training course in Peru in 2007 of an assessment of the impact of a free trade agreement between 
Peru and the U.S. Positive follow-up comment received from Peru’s Minister of Foreign Trade 
indicates that the model has since been adapted to analyze the impact of bilateral trade agreement 
scenarios with other potential trading partners. Course work from a four-week training course in 
Senegal on trade modeling in 2007 resulted in the preparation of a report on the impact of 
Economic Partnership Agreements between the EU and ACP countries which received 
prominent attention in government and public debate with clear indications that the exercise 
influenced the evolution of Senegal’s negotiations with Brussels. 
Turning to the survey undertaken specifically for this study, most respondents indicated they did 
not have sufficient direct exposure to IFPRI’s capacity-building work to rank its usefulness. Of 
the 16 respondents who offered comment in this area, only 10 assessed usefulness, with an equal 
distribution between the extremely useful and moderately useful rankings. Qualitative comments 
from participants and observers of these activities suggest considerable value is seen in assisting 
developing countries which have limited trade analytical capacity to develop skills in this area.  
Target countries needed to be selected carefully, not least because a number of providers of this 
sort of assistance are active in the field. Careful selection of participants in capacity-building 
activities was also stressed, with potential important opportunities for dialogue with policy 
decisionmakers as a priority. Some combination of capacity training activity and IFPRI-managed 
research involving direct field work was seen as very helpful in this regard, with IFPRI’s work in 
Pakistan seen as a very good example. Some suggested that training in model building involved 
such heavy investment to produce worthwhile continuing capability and that it might be more 
productive to focus instead on training in the interpretation of modeling results. Others, however, 
stressed the value of policymakers in developing countries being able to see through their own 
the modeled impacts of alternative policy options.  
Views About How IFPRI Might Enhance the Impact of Its Trade-Related Work 
Survey and interview responses to questions about IFPRI’s influence on the Doha negotiations 
and ways in which that could be enhanced frequently suggested more attention needed to be paid 
to dissemination, particularly to participants in the negotiating process. 
Large numbers of respondents stressed the importance of IFPRI having a more regular presence 
in Geneva and key capitals in both developing countries and key donor countries. Some went so 
far as to suggest the establishment of an IFPRI office in Geneva or shared facilities with a like-
minded development-oriented organization. Some expressed the view, consistent with the 
conclusions of Section III of the Report, that IFPRI had made an important early contribution to 
the Doha process and in recent years had built its contribution very considerably. In the 
intervening years, however, it was seen to have “vacated the space” to some extent at a time 
when positions on key issues in the negotiations had become rather firmly set. It was therefore 
important, they argued, for IFPRI now to engage more energetically in the process to be heard. 
Geneva-based negotiators and WTO Secretariat staff underlined the importance of direct 
engagement for building understanding and awareness of IFPRI’s work. This was seen as 
necessary to establish rapport of confidence and trust with negotiators but also to attune IFPRI’s 38 
researchers to the main issues and concerns affecting the positions adopted in the negotiations. 
One respondent from an influential research institution said it was important to be willing to take 
preliminary research results to the negotiators in Geneva and key capitals to “road test” their 
validity, to answer difficult questions and to build a practical sense of the key issues for a 
relevant forward research agenda. In addition to open events to publicize important research 
results, many suggested it was very important to engage also at the level of the member-driven 
negotiating groups where more frank and targeted exchange could occur. Coordinating 
Ambassadors from three of the key negotiating groups (G20, Africa, and G33) indicated their 
willingness to facilitate presentations by IFPRI researchers. Other influential institutions 
suggested IFPRI consider partnerships for joint activities, along the lines of a workshop 
organized in March 2008 with ICTSD which explored the implications of the then most recent 
draft modalities text issued by the chair of the negotiations. Others suggested IFPRI could 
expand the work it did with think tanks and groups more specialized in publicizing research 
findings and advocating policy responses to governments and others. 
In responding to questions about enhancing impact many respondents stressed the importance of 
IFPRI retaining its reputation for research quality, objectivity, and credibility. A number of 
interviewees suggested that a large volume of less reliable material on Doha was being circulated 
to negotiators and it was important for rigorous and objective material to be aired. Much material 
was seen as being “made to measure” research and some government respondents indicated 
frankly that they sought out and made us of material which supported their negotiating positions 
while deflecting or ignoring that which was at odds with them.  
To be of real value to negotiators, many indicated research should be presented in short, clear 
format and those who were familiar with IFPRI’s Research Briefings commented positively on 
them in these respects. They also stressed it was important for research to be focused on critical 
issues actually in play or looming in the negotiations. Research, however compelling, which 
deals with issues that have already been resolved is of limited value to negotiators.  
Some felt IFPRI might have “paid a price” for being too serious and not chasing punchy 
headlines. They argued that IFPRI should be more assertive in commenting on poor quality 
research and arguing more firmly for positions which would be growth and development 
friendly. Others saw a delicate balancing act between quality and advocacy and expressed some 
anxiety about IFPRI moving too far in the direction of advocacy. Most felt the balance was 
reasonably good with IFPRI neither shying away from controversy (for example, in its work on 
ambition and special products) nor reducing complexity and quality to achieve headlines. Almost 
all, however, said that more effort was needed to attract the attention of negotiators and other 
influential commentators.  
Targeted emailing of IFPRI’s research reports and briefings to key players in Geneva, trade 
advisors in capitals, and other influential groups was seen as very important to make sure its 
exposure was increased. Several respondents suggested that attention to the quality and 
navigability of IFPRI’s website would help it to enhance exposure of its trade work. Establishing 
links on websites of other organizations, including the WTO, was also suggested as a good way 
to build focus around new work. 
Outside the immediate negotiating environment, some suggested IFPRI might be able to enhance 
the prominence given to its trade work if it published more substantial research volumes from 39 
time to time, along the lines of the landmark World Bank products such as the Hertel and 
Winters volume on Poverty and the WTO (2006). Another suggestion was for the publication of 
a compendium which would update and draw together the most important pieces of IFPRI’s 
research on Doha. Yet another idea was for flagship agricultural trade report to be produced on 
an annual basis, to mark IFPRI’s place in this field and attract a regular following of the kind that 
accompanies the World Bank’s World Development Report or the OECD’s Monitoring and 
Evaluation Reports. 
The importance of a continuing focus on the negotiations was argued by one government official 
actively involved in the process who indicated that in the early Doha period IFPRI’s work had 
been a key resource but that after the drop away in research outputs in the 2003–2004 period 
they had “simply stopped checking IFPRI’s website”.  
These comments and other ideas are developed further as recommendations in the final Section 
of the Report. 
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VI.  IFPRI’S DOHA RESEARCH IN CITATIONS  
AND MEDIA REPORTING 
To supplement the views about IFPRI’s work from expert observers and participants in the Doha 
negotiations presented in the last Section of the report, this Section considers information 
available from a major citation database and an online bibliographic information service for the 
full years in which data are available between 1999 and 2007. An analysis has also been made of 
references to IFPRI’s Doha related research in media reporting.  
The material presented in this Section has the advantage of offering objective data on the impact 
of IFPRI’s Doha research. That said, these sources can only be considered a partial measure of 
impact. The citation and bibliographic databases provide useful insights into the absolute and 
relative frequency with which each of the IFPRI Doha-related research products have been cited 
or downloaded but there is a natural skewing in the usage of these sources of information to the 
academic and research communities. As noted in the previous Section and in the Statement of 
Work associated with this evaluation project, the views of policymakers involved in the Doha 
negotiations is considered to be particularly relevant and they are unlikely to be reflected in this 
data. A review of media references to IFPRI’s Doha work provides a different and important 
insight into the extent to which IFPRI materials have been entered into broader public debate 
about the negotiations and an attempt is made in this Section to evaluate IFPRI’s media ‘reach’. 
Google Scholar Citations 
Google scholar was chosen as the most broadly representative database of citations appropriate 
to this subject matter. It includes citation information from peer-reviewed and non-peer-reviewed 
papers, theses, books, abstracts, and articles, from academic publishers, professional societies, 
pre-print repositories, universities, and other scholarly organizations. To a greater extent than 
some other citations databases, it includes less formal research materials such as policy briefs, 
discussion papers, working papers conference papers, and dissertations. Further information 
about Google Scholar is available at http://scholar.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html. 
A search of Google Scholar revealed that of the 90 IFPRI research outputs related to Doha from 
1999 to 2007 reviewed for this Report (listed in Appendix V), 61 were captured and of those, 55 
outputs were cited at least once and six were captured but not cited. As shown in Figure 6 over 
half of the 496 citations referred to 11 IFPRI authored journal articles and 14 discussion papers. 
Another 31 percent of citations referred to two books and seven book chapters by IFPRI authors. 
The rest referred to other forms of IFPRI publications such as five research briefs, 10 conference 
papers, one research report, and five other publications (essays, press briefings, etc.). Figure 7 
shows the number of IFPRI publications per year and how many times those publications were 
cited between2000–2007. For example, in 1999 there were three IFPRI publications accounting 
for 65 citations in various sources. Table 1 shows the types of publications which cited IFPRI’s 
work, with the most common forms of citations being reports and journal articles.  42 
Figure 6.  Share of citations by type of IFPRI-authored publication (2000–2007) 
 
Note: “Other” denotes IFPRI authored publications including essays, press briefings, and commentaries. 
 
 






























































Table 1.  Types of publications citing IFPRI’s work on Doha by year  
(Covers IFPRI’s research from 1999–2007) 
    2000 2001 2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  Total 
Books  2 2 0  9  10 15  19 14  71 
Briefs  0 2 1  3  0  0  2  3  11 
JA  2 6 4  8  10 24  26 29  109 
Reports  1 3 4 19  34 35  24 18  138 
Other  1  3  16  20 27  31 32  37  167 
Total cit. per year  6  16  25  59  81  105  103  101  496 
Notes:  
a)  “JA” denotes journal articles, including both peer-reviewed and non-peer reviewed.  
b)  “Reports” include citations of IFPRI’s work in discussion papers, working papers, and research reports. 
c)  “Other” includes conference papers, keynote addresses, dissertations, essays, and other short, non-peer 
reviewed publications.  
 
The following three figures reflect the number of citations of IFPRI’s Doha research between 
2000 and 2007. In Figure 8, this information is broken down by the type of publication in which 
the citation appeared. Figure 9 shows the total number of citations collectively in each year of 
this period. Figure 10 shows in a pie chart which types of publications cited IFPRI’s Doha work. 
 
Figure 8.  Types of publications citing IFPRI’s work on Doha  
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Figure 9.  Total number of citations per year (2000–2007) 
 
 
Figure 10.  Share of various publications citing IFPRI (2000–2007) 
 
 
Figure 11 shows the top 20 IFPRI’s Doha-related publications cited in Google Scholar. 
Interestingly, the top two entries in this list are not materials directly related to the Doha 
negotiations. Rather, they are the short book by Josling, Roberts, and Orden (2004) on food 
regulation and trade and the work by Orden, Paarlberg, and Roe (1999) on policy reform in 
American agriculture. The next two most commonly cited outputs reflect more closely the views 
of survey respondents about the most useful IFPRI work on Doha, with the Diaz-Bonilla, 
Thomas, Robinson, and Cattaneo (2000) discussion paper on food security and the WTO in third 
position and the Bouët, Bureau, Decreux, and Jean (2005) article on the contrasting fortunes of 
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and rural poverty in Benin (2005) was in fifth place, followed by the Burfisher, Robinson, and 
Thierfelder (2004) discussion paper on regionalism and then the Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean 
(2006) chapter on preference erosion which appeared in a World Bank volume.  
There are few other surprises in the rankings by citation of the research materials with those 
highlighted in Section V of this Report reflecting the views of participants and commentators on 
the Doha negotiations generally also attracting attention. There is unavoidably some distortion in 
the Google Scholar count since those materials produced earlier in the period can be captured 
over a larger number of years than more recent research. Nevertheless, this data provide some 
collateral information about the relative interest, at least as reflected in the research-oriented 
community, in IFPRI’s Doha work. 
 
Figure 11. Top 20 most cited IFPRI’s publications from Google Scholar  




RePEc Download Information 
An alternative set of information on accessing of IFPRI’s Doha materials was extracted from the 
RePEc (Research Papers in Economics), a volunteer-driven initiative of the University of 
Wisconsin providing bibliographic information on working papers, journal articles, books, 




























Of the 90 IFPRI research outputs from 1999 to 2007 under consideration for this Report, only 36 
were uploaded in the RePEc database of which 5 were not downloaded and 31 were downloaded 
at least once. They are mainly discussion papers and journal articles, in effect because these 
forms of research were most commonly available in the RePEc database (see figure 12). 
Unfortunately, most of the information sought from RePEc was generally only available from 
2003.  
Figure 13 displays information on RePEc downloads and abstract views of IFPRI publications by 
year for the period 2003 to 2007. 
Figure 12.  Share of downloads by type of IFPRI-authored publication 
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An analysis of the particular IFPRI research outputs most commonly downloaded tells a 
somewhat different story from the Google Scholar citations and the survey respondent 
information.   
The most commonly downloaded item was the Mullen, Orden, and Gulati (2005) discussion 
paper on PSE estimates for India followed by the discussion paper version of the Burfisher, 
Robinson, and Thierfelder (2000) work on small countries and regionalism vs. multilateralism, a 
further elaboration of which from 2004 was the fourth most commonly downloaded work (see 
Figure 14). Thomas and Orden’s discussion paper on agricultural policies and PSEs in Indonesia 
(2004) came in at third ranking and at fifth ranking was another of the PSE-related studies in the 
form of a discussion paper which drew on PSE work on India and China to explore measurement 
issues and in particular the treatment of exchange rate misalignment. Work by Diaz-Bonilla and 
others on food security and trade liberalization is represented in various formats in relatively 
high rankings (sixth, eighth, eleventh, and twelfth), a discussion paper by Morley and Pineiro 
(2004) on the WTO, the FTAA and poverty in Mexico appears at seventh and Orden’s 2002 
discussion paper on the Farm Bill, and the U.S. WTO proposal is at 10
th ranking. Diao et al. 
(2003) on China’s WTO accession ranks 12
th and Minot and Daniels’ cotton study on Benin is in 
13
th place. Bouët et al. (2006) on preference erosion is at 14
th place.  
Figure 14.  Top 20 downloads of IFPRI’s publications from RePEc  
(Cumulative downloads 2003–2007)  
 
 
Figure 15 provides download statistics for 26 IFPRI publications from IFPRI’s website. These 
statistics are available only for 2006–2007 and there is an unavoidable distortion in the data since 
the most recent publications have been available for download for a briefer period. The picture 
which emerges, nevertheless, is of substantial interest across the full spectrum of IFPRI’s Doha-




























interviews as well as in the Google and RePEc databases is captured well by the download 
information from IFPRI’s own website.  
 
Figure 15.  Downloads from IFPRI's website (2006–2007) 
 
 
It is difficult to draw firm conclusions about the use to which downloaded material has been put 
since the context in which they are used is not recorded as is the case with citations. What seems 
clear, however, is that there is a serious market for the detailed and scholarly work on trade 
liberalization and the agricultural sectors of developing countries. The high interest in both 
RePEc and IFPRI downloads in IFPRI’s PSE-related outputs provides support for the value of 
this intensely detailed and resource intensive work as an input to further work in this field. The 
more negotiations-oriented work, particularly that of Bouët and others in more recent years, has 
not captured the same level of interest in RePEc downloads as it did in the survey and interview 
respondent group more closely connected with the Doha negotiations. For illustration, the 2006 
discussion paper on what the poor could expect from trade liberalization received 37 downloads 
compared with 392 for the Mullen, Orden, and Gulati discussion paper on PSEs and Indian 
agriculture (see Figure 14). By comparison, however, the more negotiations-focused work of 
Bouët and others from 2005–2006 received high download counts from IFPRI’s website and 
further downloads for the more recent outputs could be expected (Figure 15). 
Comparing IFPRI’s Citation and Download Counts with Research from Other Providers 
To provide a comparison with citations of IFPRI’s work, Google Scholar citations and RePEc 
download information were extracted for three significant World Bank research products and the 


























have been chosen because they were all produced at around the same time (late 2005 and 2006) 
and because each attracted considerable attention in the negotiations and associated media debate 
in the lead-up to and aftermath of the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. The World 
Bank outputs chosen for comparison were the paper by Anderson and Martin released in 
November 2005 on agricultural trade reform and Doha, the larger volume of papers edited by 
Anderson and Martin in which the paper was reproduced as the first chapter, published in 2006, 
and a chapter by Anderson, Martin, and van der Mensbrugghe in another 2006 World Bank 
volume on Doha edited by Richard Newfarmer. The IFPRI outputs chosen as relevant 
comparators are the Bouët, Bureau, and Decreux article which also attracted attention with its 
argument that previous estimates of benefits from Doha had been too high and the Bouët, 
Fontagne, and Jean work on preference erosion which actually appeared in the 2006 World Bank 
volume edited by Anderson and Martin. The 2006 Carnegie study by Polaski also had high 
profile in the negotiating environment as attested by interview and survey respondents.  
The results are set out below and overall show that leading IFPRI research compares rather 
favorably with high impact research from other sources. The Google Scholar citations for the 
two pieces of work by Bouët and others scored between the numbers of citations for the 
individual pieces of World Bank authored research. And since the Bouët, Fontagne, and Jean 
research was included in the 2006 World Bank publication edited by Anderson and Martin, it can 
be seen in a sense as sharing the highest citation count (144) of this exercise.  
Table 2.  Comparison of citation and download statistics for similar work 
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Media Coverage of IFPRI’s Doha Research 
A search of the information held by IFPRI’s Communications Division about media references 
to Doha-related work has been reported below by numbers of news articles or electronic media 
shows in the period from 2001 to 2007. Table 3 displays the raw data which cumulatively comes 
to 230 references over the eight years.  
 
Table 3.  Summary of Media Coverage of IFPRI’s work on Doha 
(Number of news articles or news shows referring to IFPRI from 2001–2008) 
 Jan  Feb
. 
Mar Apr  May  June  July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec. Total
/Year 
2001  0  1  1 2 0 0 0  2  0  1 1 0  8 
2002  4  0  0 6 1 0 0  0  1  1 1 0 14 
2003  3  0  5 4 3 5 0 28 40  4 1 3 96 
2004  1  1  4 0 5 2 1  3  2  3 0 0 22 
2005  2  6 11 0 5 1 1  3  2  1 6 3 41 
2006  1  1  1 1 1 5  18  1  2  1 0 0 32 
2007  0  1  0 0 1 7 1  0  1  0 3 3 17 
Total/Month 11  10  22 13 16 20 21  37  48  11 12  9 230 
 
Figure 16 shows a breakdown of these references according to whether the media outlet was part 
of the internationally-represented media outlets such as the wire services (14 percent), those 
operating in developing countries (49 percent) and those in developed countries (37 percent). 










The information is also captured in bar chart form in Figure 17 which shows more clearly the 
bunching of media attention around research relevant to particular events in the Doha process. 
Very clear peaks occur around the time of the WTO’s failed Cancun Conference in August and 
September of 2003. Another peak of interest is shown in June and July of 2006 around the time 
that Director General Lamy suspended the Doha negotiations. The third evident lift in interest in 
IFPRI’s Doha commentary from media outlets is in the first half of 2005 when contentious 
debate was in play about how to translate the 2004 Framework Agreement into full modalities, 
which was intended to be completed at the Hong Kong Conference in December of that year. 
Figure 17.  Media Coverage of IFPRI’s work on Doha  




The detailed information supporting this graph is in a form that does not lend itself easily to 
representation in a summary form for this Report but has been made available to IFPRI’s 
Communications Division and could be accessed on request. It covers mainstream print media 
reporting and Op Ed or editorial material as well as radio and television programs mentioning 
IFPRI’s work or interviewing IFPRI researchers. Major international, national and regional 
outlets figure in the entries. Perhaps reflecting IFPRI’s head office location, there is a strong 
representation of American media outlets. Again, perhaps reflecting IFPRI’s field locations, the 
Indian media also appear with considerable frequency. That said, there is a wide capturing by 
media outlets across the globe so in the developing countries in addition to India, there are 
references from Bangladesh, Brazil, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Senegal, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Uganda, 
United Arab Emirates, and Zimbabwe. From developed countries, in addition to the 
preponderance of American national and regional media outlets, references are recorded from 
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and the UK.  
The geographic dispersion of IFPRI media references and the strong interest evident from media 
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variety of media outlets showing interest in IFPRI’s work and the evident effort made by IFPRI 
researchers to reach broad audiences through their appearances on radio and television programs 
as well as through background press briefings.  
A short comment on the intensity of effort required to compile the necessary information to 
explore citations and media references to IFPRI’s Doha work is hard to avoid. While the material 
is collected and broadly categorized by subject by IFPRI’s routine processes, a very considerable 
effort was required with research assistance from IFPRI, to put this material into accessible form 
that could be analyzed in a meaningful way.  Information of this kind is more readily accessible 
in some comparable institutions (including the World Bank and the WTO) and its easy 
availability is essential for an organization well focused on impact in developing and prioritizing 
its work program. An investment in more systematic entry and logging of impact through 
citations from the point of publication of individual research outputs would be of considerable 
value. 
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VII.   ILLUSTRATING PATHWAYS TO IMPACT  
FROM IFPRI’S DOHA WORK 
Section IV of the Report commented on the difficulties involved in evaluating the impact of 
IFPRI’s trade research through the complex and multi-actor business of multilateral trade 
negotiations. As a supplement to the survey information presented above, this Section draws on 
narratives extracted from the interview process to illustrate in a tangible way the influence of 
some specific IFPRI research materials and capacity-building activity on government policies. 
The further step in IFPRI’s strategic framework for impact, from policy change through to 
impacts on poor people is even more difficult to broach, and as noted above, the time span 
between decisions on national negotiating positions, through to multilateral trade outcomes and 
their staged implementation is very long. Some attempt will be made, however, to comment in 
this area. 
Reform in Global Cotton markets and Rural Poverty in Benin 
Concern about a dramatic 40 percent decline in world cotton prices in 2001–2002 stimulated an 
IFPRI project, funded by the World Bank, to examine the impact of these price changes on 
poverty in Benin. IFPRI, in conjunction with a local research firm in Benin, had collected data 
during 1998 from 899 households for a BMZ-funded study on the impact of agricultural reform 
on smallholder farmers in Benin. This data formed a major input to IFPRI’s 2002 cotton study 
conducted by Nicholas Minot and Lisa Daniels.  
Benin has a population of about six million with a per capita GDP of $380, placing Benin in the 
poorest 20 percent of countries. IFPRI’s study adopted a poverty line of $123 per person per 
year, at which 40 percent of the rural households are poor. Cotton is grown by about one-third of 
rural households who are among the poorest of Benin’s farmers. 
Using the household survey information, Minot and Daniels simulated the effects of cotton price 
changes on household income and therefore on the proportion of rural households living below 
the poverty line. The study concluded that a 40 percent reduction in the farm-level price of 
cotton (as witnessed in 2001–2002) reduced the income of cotton growers by 21 percent and 
reduced the average income of rural households by 7 percent. This would cause the poverty rate 
to rise from 40 percent to 48 percent in the short run. In absolute terms, a further 334,000 people 
would fall below the poverty line. In the long run, farmers would respond by switching to other 
crops but even in the long run, Minot and Daniels estimated a 46 percent to 47 percent increase 
in the poverty rate, with a down side risk from multiplier effects on non-cotton growers. 
The study drew a clear link between policies which subsidize cotton production in the U.S. and 
elsewhere which dampen world cotton prices and rural poverty in Benin and other poor cotton-
exporting countries. 
Minot and Daniels’ work was published by IFPRI as a discussion paper in November 2002. (A 
version of the study was subsequently published in the Journal of Agricultural Economics, 
submitted in 2003 and published in 2005.) The findings were also presented at the Northeast 
Universities Development Consortium annual meetings in October 2002, at a workshop at the 54 
World Bank in January 2003, and at a seminar at IFPRI in May 2003 for a group of African 
women working in rural development.   
This timing coincided with a growing focus in the WTO on distortions in the world cotton 
market which were highlighted in a dispute panel (WTO DS 267) established to consider the 
case brought against U.S. cotton subsidies by Brazil with 15 other countries as third parties to the 
dispute, including Benin and Chad. Nicholas Minot, the lead researcher in IFPRI’s study, was 
contacted by legal advisors in the case and invited to present his findings to the dispute panel on 
behalf of Benin as a third party to the dispute. He submitted a short paper outlining the IFPRI 
conclusions and appeared in person on 6 October 2003. According to a member of the legal team 
in this case, he was a “very credible expert witness” whose “focus on the poverty implications of 
developed-country cotton subsidies was critically important”. As noted in the time line of key 
Doha events, the panel reported in September 2004 and the Appellate Body in March 2005, 
essentially supporting Brazil’s claims that the U.S. subsidies were prohibited export subsidies. 
In parallel with the WTO dispute, attention of development advocacy groups, and particularly 
Oxfam, as well as developing-country participants in the Doha process, had turned to the cotton 
story and in the lead up to the WTO’s Cancun Ministerial Conference the issue became 
something of a lightning rod for arguments that developed countries were offering too little, 
especially on the domestic support pillar. As outlined in Section III of the Report, pressure for 
deeper and faster reductions of distortions in developed-country cotton subsidies and market 
access barriers became something of a cause célèbre in the negotiations. Both at Cancun and at 
the subsequent WTO Conference in Hong Kong, cotton was given specific attention and treated 
by some advocates as a litmus test of the development impact of Doha proposals. As noted also 
in Section III, a cotton-specific negotiating group has established itself as an active part of the 
negotiations and a special sub-Committee of the agricultural negotiations, also chaired by 
Crawford Falconer, has been established to follow through on the Hong Kong Conference 
commitments related to cotton. Subsequent draft modalities texts have included possible cotton-
specific commitments contrary to the practice in past rounds and any final agreement will almost 
certainly include accelerated and deeper cuts in tariffs and domestic support for this product. 
Some have argued that the focus on cotton has had a distorting effect on the real development 
issues at stake in Doha. The poverty impacts of distorting developed-country subsidies could be 
demonstrated starkly in the case of a fiber product. By comparison, when considering the poverty 
impacts associated with removing distortion in world trade for food products, benefits for 
developing-country producers have to be considered in the context of offsetting costs for the 
poorest consumers. Moreover, some argue that the focus on developed-country subsidies through 
the case of cotton has encouraged developing countries and development NGOs to be 
inappropriately focused on reforms to domestic support disciplines rather than on market access 
where most mainstream studies indicate the overwhelmingly largest gains can be made. 
There is something to those arguments, but the case made in IFPRI’s research was also correct. 
Some work on West African cotton markets was done around the same time by the World Bank 
itself (Badiane, Ghura, Goreux, and Masson 2002). Dan Sumner (2006) produced important 
work on the subject and also appeared as an expert witness for Brazil in the WTO dispute panel 
hearings. IFPRI’s work, however, had particular credibility, not least because of the way it had 
soundly integrated the detailed household survey information from Benin with simulations of 
changes in world cotton prices.  55 
It is difficult to imagine a more powerful way for high quality research making the case for the 
poor to be taken through a pathway of policy influence than through a legally binding dispute 
resolution process. Tangible action has been taken already to adjust U.S. support policies and 
while this remains the subject of further WTO dispute action, more changes are anticipated. As 
noted above, a Doha agreement, when concluded, is also likely to commit faster and deeper 
action to remove distortions in cotton trade than in the sector generally. It is clear from IFPRI’s 
research and that of others that this will have very significant positive benefits for some of the 
world’s poorest farmers and rural communities. IFPRI’s contribution in this area stands as a very 
impressive example of impact.  
Duty Free and Quota Free (DFQF) Market Access for LDCs 
Another tangible illustration of influence in IFPRI’s Doha work has emerged from the two 
propositions made by Bouët, Mevel, and Orden (2006b) for making a Doha outcome more 
development-friendly. Consistent with the arguments from the World Bank and others at the 
time, IFPRI’s authors argued that the relatively unambitious proposals under discussion would 
have limited development impact. They used the results of their impact modeling to suggest the 
development impact of an agreement could be significantly enhanced if the EU proposal for 100 
percent of all goods from LDCs were given free access to markets rather than allowing for carve 
outs in line with the positions of some major economies (including the U.S. and Japan). They 
also called for much more limited sensitive and special product exclusions from general tariff 
cuts than proposed by the major developed and developing countries in the negotiations.  
The numbers on the DFQF scenario were compelling with IFPRI estimating LDCs could lift 
their real income gain from Doha from around $1.03 billion without 100 percent DFQF access to 
$7 billion if it were included on the Doha outcome. In addition, with the 100 percent DFQF 
access element, all low-income regions and groups would benefit rather than only five in the 
basic scenario. These proposals from IFPRI came at a time when, as outlined in section III of the 
Report, the Doha process was on life support and it was clear that further concessions from most 
parties would be needed to avoid a complete breakdown. IFPRI had been in active dialogue in 
Washington with some of the think tanks and development groups (Hewlett Foundation, German 
Marshall Fund, Bread for the World, and others) who were concerned about the risk of failure for 
Doha and the Research Brief in part responded to questions from these groups about what could 
be done.  
The Research Brief itself was in the best tradition of policy focused research which incorporated 
complex material into a short 5-page format without concessions to quality and nuance but 
written in clear and persuasive language. The material attracted significant media attention, as 
reflected in Section VI of this Report, including being the central focus of a New York Times 
column by Robert Samuelson and an associated contribution also citing the IFPRI work on 14 
August 2006 by Susan Sechler (German Marshall Fund) and Ann Tutwiler (Hewlett 
Foundation). Moreover, interest in the Duty Free and Quota Free LDC initiative grew as the 
issue was debated in policy circles in Washington since it was clear that U.S. policy sensitivity to 
domestic sugar and textile interests was a key obstacle to the proposal being adopted in the 
WTO. Interest was shown by trade-oriented groups in the U.S. Congress and following briefings 
and further debate, the idea found some expression in legislation drafted for Congressional 
consideration.  56 
Within the Congressional environment, the work also stimulated interest in further improvements 
of the American preferences program more generally. Debate arose around the question of 
whether moving to 100 percent free access for LDCs would have some damaging impacts on 
poor African preference recipient countries by allowing tough competition from more 
competitive countries like Bangladesh. These questions in turn became the subject of further 
IFPRI research, leading to the Bora, Bouët, and Roy (2007) work which, as described in Section 
III of this Report, concluded that while preferences were important for a number of African 
countries, interventions to improve trade-related infrastructure could yield high returns. Put 
bluntly, it could be more productive to assist poor African countries through targeted Aid for 
Trade support than through denying other LDCs the opportunity to compete in developed 
country markets.  
The work by Bouët, Mevel, and Orden was followed by an elaboration by Laborde of the DFQF 
issue using the May 2008 draft modalities text. It presented conclusions and recommendations to 
negotiators to negotiators which would maximize benefits for LDCs. This work confirmed the 
conclusion that the exclusion of up to 3 percent of tariff lines by developed countries would 
largely erode the benefits. It also made a strong case for emerging economies agreeing to extend 
DFQF treatment to LDCs, even for 97 percent of their tariff lines.  
The DFQF proposal from IFPRI’s work does not have the same satisfying conclusion as the 
Benin cotton story. Nevertheless, it is another excellent example of high quality research being 
presented at the right time and disseminated with skill and vigor to key points of influence in 
think tanks, NGOs, the media, and the Congress. The issue remains on the table and may yet 
bear fruit in the eventual Doha outcome. 
Re-thinking of Trade Policy Positioning by Pakistan 
In the course of the survey and interview work conducted for this Report numerous respondents 
indicated that IFPRI research products and capacity-building exercises had influenced the 
attitudes and negotiating positions of participants in Doha.   
One such example emerged in discussions with officials and researchers from Pakistan, who 
placed particular importance on the impact in Islamabad of research by Orden, Salam, Dewina, 
Nazli, and Minot (2006) as part of an Asian Development Bank-funded poverty assessment 
update. Subsequent work was also done on wheat market impacts in Pakistan. The study used a 
similar methodology to that used by Minot and Daniels for Benin and generated reductions in 
poverty in Pakistan of 1.939 million people from a 20 percent increase in cotton prices. In 
addition, IFPRI had conducted two training sessions in trade analysis focused on CGE modeling 
for researchers in Pakistan during May and July of 2006. 
At the outset of the Doha negotiations, Pakistan had aligned itself with the net food importing 
group of countries and played an essential defensive role, seeking to limit reduction 
commitments and calling for special treatment of various kinds. As the negotiations continued, a 
combination of influences at home and internationally, through debate in Geneva and elsewhere, 
led to a dramatic shift in Pakistan’s position on international trade reform. From its defensive 
position at the outset of Doha, Pakistan joined the advocates of ambition in the negotiations and 
became a member of the Cairns Group in December 2005. This change in approach has been 
attributed to Pakistani policymakers seeing important new opportunities for development and 57 
poverty reduction through export-oriented agriculture not only in cotton and grains but also dairy 
production. An ambitious liberalizing Doha outcome was therefore deemed to be the most 
development-friendly way forward and Pakistan’s position in the negotiations was adapted 
accordingly. 
Clearly, the change in thinking in Pakistan was already in train by the time IFPRI delivered its 
training sessions and undertook its work on cotton and wheat. Survey respondents nevertheless 
indicated that IFPRI’s work confirmed and consolidated this change in approach. They indicate 
that IFPRI’s work had an important influence on Pakistan’s thinking about the Doha 
negotiations. 
Modeling Trade Scenarios in Peru 
A final example of high impact is drawn from IFPRI’s capacity-building activity. As listed in 
Appendix VII, a four-week training exercise on the use of the Mirage model and the MAcMap 
database was conducted by IFPRI staff, Antoine Bouët and Simon Mevel, in October and 
November 2006 and February 2007. As part of the training session activity, participants from the 
Government of Peru and research institutions prepared a report for the Peruvian Government on 
the impact of a Peru/US FTA. The same modeling format has since been used by Peruvian 
officials to assess the impacts of FTAs with China and the EU. The value of this modeling 
capability seen in Peru is reflected in a letter of 20 March, 2007 from the Minister of Finance, 
Madame Mercedez Araoz Fernandez, to IFPRI’s Director General which expressed appreciation 
for the sessions which had enhanced Peru’s capacity to “rigorously identify costs and benefits 
emerging from a set of trade agreements, useful information to the design of trade policy and an 
optimum negotiating path….” (informal translation by IFPRI staff). 
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VIII.  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Overall Value of IFPRI’s Doha Work 
An impressive body of research and training outputs 
In the period from 1999 to July 2008 during which the Doha negotiations were shaped, launched 
and have been in progress, IFPRI has produced an impressive body of high quality research 
relevant to the negotiating process. Its focus, consistent with IFPRI’s Vision and Mission, has 
been squarely on the interests of developing countries and their food security and poverty 
alleviation objectives.  
A modest but useful program of trade-related capacity strengthening activities has also been 
conducted in carefully chosen developing countries. The need and demand for this sort of 
assistance is unquestioned. The challenge for IFPRI and other providers is to target its 
contributions carefully for maximum impact, avoiding duplication with other providers and 
focusing on building capability that can be adopted in continuing national policy development. 
A review of IFPRI’s Doha-related research outputs and survey and interview responses confirm 
the broadly positive appreciation for IFPRI’s work. Its emphasis on the differentiated impacts of 
trade liberalization on developing countries with different circumstances has been consistent and 
impressive. Good use has been made of the organization’s networks and experience in the 
agricultural sectors of key developing countries to inform the focus of and enrich the quality of 
IFPRI’s work. The quality of IFPRI’s analyses is confirmed by the positive reception it receives 
from expert academic researchers and other commentators and the frequency of publication of 
IFPRI research in highly regarded peer-reviewed publications and volumes of work exited by 
leading institutions and professionals.  
Value for Money? 
IFPRI’s trade-related research and capacity-strengthening activities constitute an important but 
minor part of the organization’s overall budget and effort. The precise costs of the 100 or so 
outputs and training activities from 1999–2008 could not be ascertained for this report. It is 
relevant to note, however that about 75 percent of the resources of the global trade program 
(GRP 2) at IFPRI is derived from external funding sources, compared with 65 percent for the 
organization as a whole. This suggests reasonably strong stakeholder support for the program, 
consistent with the general findings in this Report about the quality and usefulness of the work. 
The Report does not attempt to present a classical benefits/costs assessment of the Doha-related 
activity for the reasons set out in Section IV but some suggestions follow for ways in which 
greater impact could be achieved for a steady or marginally increased investment in IFPRI’s 
trade work. 
 Attention to targets of influence and continuity of effort 
The review of materials and opinions for this project revealed some unevenness in attention to 
the Doha negotiations, with some falling away of effort during a critical period in the process 
after the unsuccessful WTO Ministerial Conference at Cancun. At a time when discordant debate 
about trade and development linkages and their significance for the balance of a Doha outcome 60 
was raging in Geneva, key capitals and development advocacy groups, the priority given by 
IFPRI to work on global agricultural trade reform reduced in volume. Relevant work was 
undertaken in this period but it was less well focused on the issues being debated in the Doha 
round and those most directly involved in its negotiation looked less to IFPRI for input. 
IFPRI’s research attention to Doha and global trade reform was re-engaged with vigor from late 
2005 and in the period since then has been of high quality, consistent, and well-judged. Many 
close observers of work in this field have appreciated IFPRI’s input. Unfortunately, extensive 
survey and interview contacts suggest there have been more limited appreciation of this work 
among negotiators in Geneva and many key capitals. 
This is not a problem that cannot be addressed. Indeed efforts are already under way by IFPRI 
staff to increase their contacts with negotiators and excellent recent examples include the 
participation of IFPRI researchers in expert workshop presentations in Geneva and Washington 
providing high quality analysis of recent draft Doha texts and WTO working documents. Some 
of this work has been done in collaboration with the Geneva-based ICTSD, and some with staff 
of CEPII and the World Bank. This has added strong complimentary expertise to IFPRI’s work 
along with a shared focus on development concerns. A number of papers and interviews also 
been published in the French language, helping with outreach to a broader audience for IFPRI’s 
work.  
Sustained continuing efforts of this kind are needed to re-establish IFPRI as an acknowledged 
centre of high quality and relevant research in this field and to ensure that IFPRI’s future trade-
related research remains well targeted on key negotiating issues. More regular visits to Geneva 
should be maintained and contact with key negotiating groups, especially those focused on 
developing-country concerns such as the G20, G33, LDC, ACP, and Tropical Products, Cotton 
and Africa Groups is important. I did not find arguments for a permanent Geneva presence 
particularly compelling. Apart from the high cost involved, the Doha Round could well be stalled 
for some time. Other influential targets for presentations of IFPRI work include key WTO 
Secretariat staff, development groups with local offices and representatives of other parties, 
including developed countries, to the negotiation.  
Much can be done between to supplement contacts in Geneva through targeted dissemination of 
reports especially electronically. A number of well placed observers suggest that too little high 
quality research material finds its way into the Geneva process. IFPRI has already grasped the 
essentials of presentation of its work in formats well pitched to a policy audience, that is, in 
clear, short briefing documents which convey complex information in readable style. The 
challenge for IFPRI now is to disseminate this material more intensively to target recipients.  
Balance between research and policy targets 
IFPRI, like other research institutions, has to strike a proper balance between efforts to foster and 
affirm the analytical quality of its research and efforts to engage with parties closer to the 
outcomes and implementation end of the organization’s strategic framework for influence. The 
former involves resources-intensive investments in activities such as submissions to peer-
reviewed publications, participation in academic conferences and long-term investments in 
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sectors of developing countries. At the other end of the spectrum, resources are required for 
engagement with negotiators and other policymakers, policy advocates, and the media.  
IFPRI cannot be successful without careful attention to both targets. Attention to analytical rigor 
is the essential underpinning of its credibility in policy research and the research is unlikely to 
have high impact without vigorous attention to the issues under debate in the applied policy 
world and targeted dissemination of timely contributions to those debates. 
Based on the findings of this Report, there is a case for the balance of IFPRI’s efforts to be 
shifted modestly in favor of engagement with policymakers and dissemination of research 
outputs. Again, this Report does not suggest that IFPRI’s performance in this area needs radical 
overhaul. In recent years, in particular, the more frequent use of the Research Briefing format 
and publication of negotiation-relevant research under the Director General’s authority to avoid 
impractical delays associated with peer review, are encouraging. The recommendations later in 
this Section offer some suggestions for cost-effective ways in which this could be done. 
The conclusion that more effort is needed at the policy end of the spectrum of IFPRI’s research 
targets does not detract from evidence presented in the Report of the “international public good” 
value of some of IFPRI’s investment in more basic research capacity. The results in particular of 
the RePEc database downloads suggest considerable value is derived by other scholars from 
some of IFPRI’s more scholarly trade-related research such as the PSE studies. Similarly, the 
investment made by some IFPRI staff in the updating and further development of the MAcMap 
database, in collaboration with its originating institution, CEPII, has obvious high value for 
global trade analysts generally, having been widely acknowledged as facilitating an important 
advance in the accuracy of trade liberalization impact modeling in recent years. This work meets 
the classic definitional requirements of an international public good in having benefits that are 
both non-rival and non-excludable. Continued investment in this work pays important dividends 
for IFPRI’s own research standing and as a contribution to the organization’s broader 
development and poverty reduction goals. 
Enhancing recognition of IFPRI’s trade research 
Public recognition of IFPRI’s contribution to Doha-related research has not kept pace with the 
recent reinvigoration of effort evident in the research outputs. One possible explanation is that 
much of IFPRI’s work is published in the form of discussion papers or articles in dispersed 
publications. Some survey or interview respondents highlighted the “splash” that could be made 
with larger volumes of research published as an edited collection under the “house logo”. This in 
itself takes additional effort, as those associated with the World Bank volumes of trade-related 
research attested. Nevertheless, the payoff in public awareness terms was very clear. 
Another possibility would be for IFPRI to launch with some fanfare a new trade series of 
publications, or indeed a regular, probably annual, research report focused on critical 
developments in agricultural trade for developing countries. The OECD’s annual Monitoring and 
Evaluation reports stand as an excellent model although understandably focus mainly on 
developed-country agricultural policy. Identifying an indicator series along the lines of the 
OECD’s PSE estimations might be a useful centerpiece for an IFPRI report, along with analysis 
of trends in policies and challenges for agriculture in the developing world. IFPRI’s own 2020 
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of the sort of effort that has been made in this program could productively be turned to IFPRI’s 
trade work.  
Building on Collaborative Work with Expert Researchers and Institutions 
The highly productive collaborative work IFPRI’s trade researchers have done with think tanks 
and advocacy groups is worth comment and encouragement for this to continue and be expanded 
at the margin. Well regarded groups in the field (including ICTSD in Geneva with whom IFPRI 
has recently conducted joint outreach events) can be an effective way to tap into the skills these 
organizations have in publicizing research findings in the policy community to decisionmakers, 
their advisors, and the media. The World Bank is another obvious partner given its resources, 
skills base and development mission. The high impact of World Bank research, especially with 
governments, also suggests there is value for IFPRI in cooperation on relevant research and 
capacity building projects. Dividing responsibilities in this way allows IFPRI to concentrate the 
scarce time of their expert staff on conducting and presenting research but to benefit from the 
guidance of public policy experts on the key questions for research attention and the most 
effective way to communicate the findings to influential groups. 
IFPRI’s headquarters location in Washington also presents exceptional opportunities for working 
in this way and more might be done, for example, with more policy-charged panel debates on 
trade issues using the networks of researchers, political actors and media, to win attention for 
IFPRI.  
Building stronger impact orientation within the organization 
As noted in Section VI of this Report, a surprisingly time-consuming investment had to be made 
in, first of all getting a comprehensive set of IFPRI’s trade-related research materials as the basis 
for the evaluation. Obtaining costing information by research output also proved beyond our 
reach. Changes to organizational structure and staffing probably complicated this task more than 
might be the case for other streams of IFPRI work. Nevertheless, many weeks were required to 
trace relevant publications for the 1999 to 2007 period. Challenges were also presented in getting 
ready access to citation and media reporting information linked to these particular outcomes. 
Considerable IFRI research support was required to extract such in usable form. The material 
was all eventually accessible but for an organization concerned about impact, further investment 
in citation and media reporting information retrieval systems more closely linked to individual 
research outputs would be desirable. 
Why It Is Important for IFPRI to Retain Its Focus on Trade 
This Report does not argue for any significant change to the priority accorded to IFPRI’s trade-
related work or to its resourcing. This is not to understate the importance of retaining the 
enhanced effort that has been made over the past two or three years which has returned IFPRI’s 
efforts to the higher levels of focus and attention to trade liberalization issues that have been 
evident for much of the organization’s history.  
A strong case can be made for IFPRI consolidating and continuing its work in the period ahead. 
Earlier Sections of the Report presented information on the way the debate about agricultural 
trade liberalization and development has played out through the course of the Doha negotiations 63 
to date. Much of the struggle for consensus among the WTO’s members has centered on 
questions about the level of ambition overall in the agreement and the most appropriate forms of 
special and differential treatment to be accorded to developing countries. In the necessarily 
political negotiating environment, what has emerged through provisions for special products and 
reductions or exemptions from commitments of various kinds has not necessarily reflected 
research conclusions of IFPRI or other well-regarded research about how to achieve the biggest 
possible development dividend from Doha.   
These issues were tackled directly by the Warwick Commission which concluded in its Trade 
and Development chapter that “debate over S&D provisions in the WTO has been contentious 
and over-politicized and the need for substantive analysis has often been neglected”. The 
Commission recommended that “efforts should be redoubled to design clear, concrete S&DT 
provisions based on solid analysis of development needs and cognizant of the reality that 
differing needs among developing countries call for differentiated measures” (Warwick 
Commission 2007, p.43).  
The fact that the Doha Round has foundered on the special safeguard mechanism underlines the 
relevance of S&D treatment issues for development-oriented agricultural trade reform. Today 
more obvious differences between groups of DCs also suggest IFPRI has a role and comparative 
advantage in illuminating the issues. This will be so whether or not Doha can be revised. Some 
predict that dispute settlement is a more likely route to reform in coming years. Others point to 
unilateral national reforms or bilateral and regional trade deals. In all these cases, IFPRI’s 
mission warrants continued priority for its agricultural trade work.  
IFPRI’s voice, which the survey and interview information suggests carries weight, especially in 
the developing world and development advocacy groups, was perhaps not heard as loudly as it 
might have been when some of the key decisions about the shape of the Doha agreement were 
being settled. The opportunity remains to contribute in a more targeted way in the final stages of 
the negotiations and through the period of implementation of an eventual agreement. Some 
modest adjustments to IFPRI’s current efforts could help in this endeavor and recommendations 
are set out below.   
Recommendations for Action 
1.  A modest shift in emphasis is warranted from desk-and-field research to 
engagement with policymakers and advocates, particularly in Geneva. 
 
2.  More intensive and targeted efforts should be made to develop and actively use  
e-mail based dissemination of IFPRI’s trade-related research materials to key 
participants and commentators on the Doha negotiations. 
 
3.  Continued investment in IFPRI’s high-caliber research capability in the trade-
related area is essential; the collaboration with CEPII and involvement in the 
MAcMap database has been of great value and should be sustained; IFPRI 
involvement in the GTAP Consortium is also a high priority.  
 
4.  Consideration should be given to launching new high-profile IFPRI published trade 
outputs; a new trade series, a compendium of IFPRI research relevant to Doha; a 64 
new annual report series focused on agricultural trade developments in developing 
countries; and other initiatives are among the possibilities. 
 
5.  More active collaboration with other highly-regarded institutions in the trade-
related research field such as the World Bank, ICTSD, and the OECD is warranted, 
recognizing that each organization will have its own priorities. Particular synergies 
might be evident in provision of trade-related capacity strengthening for developing 
countries with some consideration being given to the spread of activities between 
countries and between training in model building and interpretation of model 
results. 
 
6.  Productive collaboration with think tanks, development advocacy groups, and 
others engaged in comment and debate about agricultural trade reform is 
recommended. IFPRI has some work to do to rebuild awareness of its capability in 
this field and outreach efforts of this kind can help. High profile panel debates with 
themes and participants carefully chosen for impact could be useful. Recent 
collaboration with Hewlett Foundation, German Marshall Fund, and similar groups 
should be continued.  
 
7.  Consideration should be given to further investment in user-friendly information 
retrieval systems to track the publication of IFPRI research and the associated 
citation and media reporting associated with each research output.  
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APPENDICES  






Type of organization you work for (need to create a list of organizations) 
1.  Research Institution 
2.  Think tank 
3.  Development NGO 
4.  National Government 
5.  International Organization 
6.  Media Organization 
7.  Business/Legal  
8.  Other (please specify) 
Position within organization (need to create a list of positions) 
1.  Researcher 
2.  Policy advisor 
3.  Trade negotiator (Capital based) 
4.  Trade negotiator (Geneva based) 
5.  Communications/Media representative 
6.  Other (please specify) 
Country: 
1.  Developed  
2.  Developing 74 
 
A.  WHAT RESEARCH FROM ANY SOURCE HAS BEEN MOST INFLUENTIAL IN 
SHAPING YOUR THINKING, OR YOUR ORGANIZATION’S APPROACH TO 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS? 
PLEASE GIVE UP TO THREE SPECIFIC EXAMPLES. (It would be especially helpful if 











B.    HOW MUCH DO YOU KNOW ABOUT IFPRI’S RESEARCH WORK ON 
AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS? 
i)  Little or nothing 
ii)  Have some awareness 
iii)  Reasonably familiar 
If you answered (ii) or (iii) to question B above, please respond to the following: 
C.   HOW USEFUL DID YOU FIND THESE PUBLICATIONS?  
i)  Not useful at all     (skip to question 4) 
ii)  Somewhat useful 
iii)  Useful or really useful 
If you answered (ii) or (iii) to question C above, please respond to the following: 
1.  How would you rate the overall quality of IFPRI’s work on the Doha negotiations on a scale of 
Extremely High / Moderately High / Not Very High 
 






3.  How did these publications influence your own work or your own (your organization’s or 













5.  Are you aware of specific ways in which IFPRI’s Doha work has influenced public debate, the 






6.  Do you have suggestions for how the content or presentation of IFPRI’s work on agricultural 





D.    WHAT DO YOU KNOW ABOUT IFPRI’S CAPACITY BUILDING AND TRAINING 
ACTIVITIES ON AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION FOR DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES? 
7.  Little or nothing 
8.  Have some awareness 
9.  Have participated directly 
If you answered (ii) or (iii) to question B above, please respond to the following: 
1.  Have you participated in IFPRI’s capacity building or training activities on agricultural trade 






2.  How would you rate the usefulness of IFPRI’s capacity building or training activities: 
Extremely useful / Moderately useful / Not very useful 
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APPENDIX II—LIST OF SURVEY AND INTERVIEW RESPONDENTS BY 
CATEGORY 
*Indicates participation in survey rankings 
# Indicates personal or telephone interview 
ACADEMIC RESEARCHERS 
•  Jatinder S. Beti*, National Council of Applied Economic Research, New Delhi  
•  David Blandford*#, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Penn State University 
•  Antonio Salazar Brandao*, Professor of Economics, State University of Rio de Janeiro  
•  Jean-Christophe Bureau*#, Professor of Economics, Agro-Paris Tech 
•  Papa Nouhine Dieye*, Agricultural Economist, Senegalese Institute for Agricultural Research, 
Dakar 
•  Cheickh Sadibou Fall*, Economist, ISRA-BAME, Senegal 
•  Joachim Bento de Souza Ferreira Filho*, Professor of Economics, University of Sao Paolo   
•  Harry de Gorter*, Associate Professor, Cornell University 
•  David Harvey*, Professor of Agriculture,  University of Newcastle 
•  Tom Hertel*#, Distinguished Professor, Purdue University 
•  Tim Josling*#, Emeritus Professor, Stanford University and Senior Fellow at Freeman Spogli 
Institute 
•  Jaime de Melo*#, Professor, Department of Political Economy, University of Geneva 
•  Sebastien Jean*#, Research Director, INRA Public Economics Unit, Agro-Paris Tech 
•  John Lee*, Professor of Agricultural Economics, Mississippi State University, formerly ERS,  
USDA 
•  Sohail J. Malik*, Chairman, Innovative Development Strategies, Islamabad 
•  Patrick Messerlin*#, Professor of Economics and Director, Global Economy Group, Sciences-Po, 
Paris 
•  Robert Paarlberg*, Professor of Political Science, Wellesley College and Associate, Harvard 
University 
•  Abdul Salam*, Professor of Economics and Chair, Agricultural Prices Commission, Islamabad,  
•  Luca Salvatici*, Professor of Economics, University of Molise 
•  Finn Tarp*, Professor of Economics, University of Copenhagen 
•  Robert L Thompson*#, Professor of Agricultural Policy, University of Illinois 
•  Alberto Valdes*, Senior Economic Adviser, Roles of Agriculture Project, FAO 
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APPENDIX IV—TIMELINE FOR THE DOHA NEGOTIATIONS AND 
RELATED EVENTS 
1994   (March) GATT Marrakesh Conference adopted Uruguay Round outcomes and 
created the WTO 
1995   (January) WTO established in Geneva 
1996   (December) Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference introduces “new issues” into 
consideration 
1997   (November) WTO creates framework for trade facilitation and trade related technical 
assistance 
1999   (December) WTO Ministerial Conference in Seattle disrupted by protests 
2000-2001  Discussions held on negotiating proposals for further reform, submitted by 121 
members   
2001   (November) WTO members launch Doha Round with ambitious mandate and short 
timeframe 
2002   US Congress passes Trade Promotion Authority 
2003   (March) Chair (Harbinson) issues draft text for members’ consideration 
2003   (August) US / EU Joint Text makes proposals for Cancun meeting at urging of key 
Members 
2003   (September) WTO Ministerial meeting in Cancun deadlocked over Singapore issues 
and cotton 
2004   Work resumes with meetings in Geneva and other capitals, new groups (G20, G33) 
prominent 
2004   “Five Interested Parties” (US, EU, Brazil, India, Australia) actively pursue possible 
framework 
2004   (March, April, June) Agriculture meetings in Geneva, much activity taking place in 
smaller groups 
2004   (May) EU conditional proposal on elimination of export subsidies and dropping 3 
Singapore issues 
2004   (July) Negotiating meeting on Framework agreement involving around 30 Ministers 
and officials 
2004   (August) Framework Agreement adopted; cotton reference added, notes deadline not 
achievable 
2004   (September) WTO Panel Report on US / Brazil cotton case; (Appellate Body Report 
March 2005) 
2005   Negotiations on “Modalities” underway with formal and informal issues meetings 
about monthly 
2005   (December) WTO Ministerial meeting in Hong Kong, end date set for export subsidy 
elimination 
2006   (June) chair (Falconer) issues draft modalities text  
2006   (July) Doha negotiations suspended by D-G Lamy citing wide gaps in members’ 
positions  
2007   (April) Chair (Falconer) issues “Challenges Paper” to stimulate re-engagement by 
members 
2007   (July) Chair issues revised draft modalities text 84 
2007   (July to February 2008) Intensive negotiations on key issues, much in 37 member 
“Room E” group 
2008   (February) Chairs (Falconer and Stephenson) issue further revised agriculture and 
NAMA texts  
2008  (May) Chairs (Falcones and Stephen) issue yet another revision of Agriculture and 
NAMA texts 
2008  (July) Further revised agriculture and NAMA Texts issued and intensive Ministerial 
level negotiations held from 21 July in Geneva 
2008  Director General Lang puts forward proposal to settle remaining issues on 25 July 
2008  Doha negotiations breakdown on 29 July and are suspended 
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model and MAcMap database to assist with Peru’s assessment of the impacts of FTAs 
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regional governments 100 
Dhaka, Bangladesh – September 2002 
A second WTO trade modeling workshop was conducted by Channing Arndt, Paul Dorosh 
(IFPRI) and Christen Lungren which focused on the use of modeling tools (combining CGE and 
micro-simulation models) to examine policy scenarios associated with financial crisis and poverty 
in Indonesia 
Jakarta, Indonesia – February 2002 
Hans Lofgren and Anne-Sophie Robilliard (DIAL) and Sherman Robinson (IFPRI) conducted a 
World Bank funded course on CGE modeling in GAMS to 17 participants from the Indonesian 
Institute of Social and Economic Research and BAPPENAS, Government of Indonesia 
Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania – 2002 
In association with a country study of Tanzania led by Peter Wobst under the MERISSA project a 
number of Tanzanian researchers from the University of Dar Es Salaam participated in training 
on Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) for Policy Analysis. Training on SAM-based CGE 
modeling had also been provided to Tanzanian researchers in previous years though courses 
conducted in Malawi and South Africa. 
  101 
 




28.  Impact Evaluation of Research by the International Food Policy Research 
Institute on Agricultural Liberalization, Developing Countries, and the WTO’s 
Doha Negotiations, by Joanna Hewitt (September 2008)  
27.  The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the Mexican 
PROGRESA Anti-Poverty and Human Resource Investment Conditional Cash 
Transfer Program, by Jere R. Behrman (December 2007) 
26.  The Impacts of IFPRI’s Global Research Program on the Sustainable 
Development of Less-Favored Areas, by John English and Mitch Renkow (November 
2007) 
25.  Impact Assessment of Food Policy Research: A Stocktaking Workshop — 
Synthesis Report, by Jock Anderson, Maria Soledad Bos, and Marc J. Cohen (December 
2005) 
24.  Regional Policy Networks: IFPRI’s Experience with Decentralization, by Robert 
Paarlberg (April 2005) 
23.  Strengthening Food Policy Through Gender and Intrahousehold Analysis: 
Impact Assessment of IFPRI Multicountry Research, by Cecile Jackson (April 2005) 
22.  The Impact of the Food-for-Education Program in Bangladesh on Schooling 
Outcomes and Earnings and the Contribution of IFPRI Research, by James G. 
Ryan and Xin Meng (November 2004) 
21.  Impact Assessment of IFPRI’s Research and Related Activities Based on 
Economywide Modeling, by Kym Anderson (December 2003) 
20.  The Impact of Economic Policy Research: Lessons on Attribution and 
Evaluation from IFPRI, by James G. Ryan and James L. Garrett (October 2003) 
19.  Impacts of IFPRI/ICARDA Policy and Property Rights Research on the 
Mashreq and Maghreb Project, by John H. Sanders and Hassan Serghini (October 
2003) 
18.  Institutional Learning and Change in the CGIAR: Summary Record of the 
Workshop Held at IFPRI, Washington, DC, February 4-6, 2003, by Ronald Mackay 102 




and Douglas Horton (October 2003) 
17.  Evaluating the Impact of Agricultural Projection Modeling Using the IMPACT 
Framework, by James G. Ryan (February 2003) 
16.  The Impact of the International Food Policy Research Institute's Research 
Program on Rural Finance Policies for Food Security for the Poor, by Jeffrey 
Alwang and V. Puhazhendhi (December 2002) 
15.  Synthesis Report of Workshop on Assessing the Impact of Policy-oriented 
Social Science Research in Scheveningen, The Netherlands November 12–13, 
2001, by  James G. Ryan (March 2002) 
14.  The Production and Diffusion of Policy Knowledge: A Bibliometric Evaluation 
of the International Food Policy Research Institute, by Philip G. Pardey and Jason 
E. Christian (January 2002) 
13.  Impact of IFPRI's Policy Research on Resource Allocation and Food Security in 
Bangladesh, by Suresh Babu (February 2000) 
12.  A Review of Food Subsidy Research at IFPRI, by Curtis Farrar (January 2000) 
11.  Assessing the Impact of Policy Research and Capacity Building by IFPRI in 
Malawi, by James G. Ryan (December 1999) 
10.  External Impact Assessment of IFPRI's 2020 Vision for Food, Agriculture, and 
the Environment Initiative, by Robert Paarlberg (June 1999) 
9.  Returns to Policy-Related Social Science Research in Agriculture, by Bruce L. 
Gardner (May 1999) 
8.  Assessing the Impact of Rice Policy Changes in Viet Nam and the Contribution 
of Policy Research, by James G. Ryan (January 1999) 103 




7.  The Value of Economic Research, by David Zilberman and Amir Heiman (January 
1999) 
6.  Policy for Plenty: Measuring the Benefits of Policy-Oriented Social Science 
Research, by George W. Norton and Jeffrey Alwang (December 1998) 
5.  Some Useful Methods for Measuring the Benefits of Social Science Research, by 
Henry E. Kilpatrick, Jr. (October 1998) 
4.  Adding Value through Policy-Oriented Research: Reflections of a Scholar-
Practitioner, by C. Peter Timmer (October 1998) 
3.  A Proposal for Measuring the Benefits of Policy-Oriented Social Science 
Research, by Donghyun Park (August 1998) 
2.  Measuring the Benefits of Social Science Research, by Vincent H. Smith (July 
1998) 
1.  IFPRI and the Abolition of the Wheat Flour Ration Shops in Pakistan: A Case-
Study on Policymaking and the Use and Impact of Research, by Yassir Islam and 
James L. Garrett (December 1997) 
 
  104 
 